Context effects in repetition priming are sense effects

Bainbridge, J. Vivien; Lewandowsky, Stephan; Kirsner, Kim

doi:10.3758/bf03197194

Cited by 32 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…In addition, Ratcliff (1979, 1986) and Goshen-Gottstein and Moscovitch (1995) investigated facilitations in making lexical decisions for words that have been viewed previously in the context of prime words. Greater priming is found when words are presented in the same context than in a different context, as before (but see also Bainbridge, Lewandowsky, & Kirsner, 1993;Carroll & Kirsner, 1982;Dagenbach, Horst, & Carr, 1990;Neely & Durgunoglu, 1985;Durgunoglu & Neely, 1987;Smith, MacLeod, Bain, & Hoppe, 1989). Depending on the particular strategies and information storage that result when different methodologies are used, new-associations priming may rely on storage of information in various subsystems.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 54%

Form-specific visual priming for new associations in the right cerebral hemisphere

1996

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In three experiments, we examined the internal processing mechanisms of relatively independent visual-form subsystems. Participants first viewed centrally presented word pairs and then completed word stems presented beneath context words in the left or right visual field. Letter-case-specific priming in stem completion was found only when the context word was the same word that had previously appeared above the primed completion word and the items were presented directly to the right cerebral hemisphere. This pattern of results was not found when participants deliberately recollected previously presented words when completing the stems. Results suggest that holistic processing, not parts-based processing as assumed in many contemporary theories of visual-form recognition, is performed in a subsystem that distinguishes specific instances in the same abstract category of form and that operates more effectively in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere.The ability to distinguish specific instances in the same abstract category of visual form is an important human faculty. One can differentiate a particular cup from other cups as well as an individual's signature from other written versions of the same set ofletters. An interesting aspect of this ability is that most theories of visual-form recognition, aside from theories that address only face recognition (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986;Rhodes, 1985), do not focus on how it is accomplished. Most theories focus instead on the ability to distinguish different abstract types of visual forms (e.g., Biederman, 1987;Morton, 1979). Of course, the latter ability is also important and interesting. One can distinguish a cup from a pen, as well as the word form "cup" from the word form "pen," even when the input is an instance that has not been seen before. In the research reported in this article, we tested whether at least relatively independent processing subsystems support the two abilities. More importantly, we examined form-specific priming for novel holistic structures to test whether holistic processing, as opposed to parts-based processing of the sort assumed in many contemporary theories of visual form recognition (e.g., Biederman, 1987;Morton, 1979), characterizes the operations in a subsystem that distinguishes specific instances in an abstract category of form. VISUAL-FORM SUBSYSTEMSWe hypothesize that a specific visual-form (SVF) subsystem underlies recognition of specific instances of forms and operates more effectively in the right cerebral hemisphere (RH) than in the left cerebral hemisphere (LH). In contrast, an abstract visual-form (AVF) subsystem supports recognition of abstract categories of forms and operates more effectively in the LH than in the RH. These subsystems likely focus on different properties of visual-form inputs to achieve different goals. SVF SubsystemIn order to produce different outputs when different instances in the same abstract category appear as inputs, an SVF subsystem must process a form's visually distinctive information ef...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 54%

Form-specific visual priming for new associations in the right cerebral hemisphere

1996

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“…As predicted by the episodic view, targets read in isolation showed more priming than did targets read in sentences. Alternatively, Bainbridge et al (1993) suggested that this pattern of results is due to the greater tendency for the same sense of a word to be activated if it is presented singly both at study and at test; embedding the target in a context at study may reduce priming if the sense biased by the context differs from that activated when the target is tested alone.…”

Section: Episodic Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional support for the sense-specific account was obtained by Bainbridge, Lewandowsky, and Kirsner (1993). In their first experiment, subjects were asked to make lexical decisions about nonhomographic items presented as possible sentence completions.…”

Section: Episodic Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Still, abstractionists could account for most episodic context effects by positing separate representations, not just for different meanings of a homograph but also for different senses of one meaning of a word (Bainbridge et al, 1993;Lewandowsky et al, 1989). However, this modification leaves unresolved the problems ofexplaining the longevity and perceptual specificity oflong-term repetition priming.…”

Section: Episodic Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Abstractionist versus episodic theories of repetition priming and word identification

1995

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This paper reviews research relevant to the question of whether words are identified through the use of abstract lexical representations, specific episodic representations, or both. Several lines of evidence indicate that specific episodes participate in word identification. First, pure abstractionist theories can explain short-term but not long-term repetition priming. Second, long-term repetition priming is sensitive to changes in surface features or episodic context between presentations of a word. Finally,long-term priming for pseudowords is also difficult for pure abstractionist theories to explain. Alternative approaches to word identification are discussed, including both pure episodic theories and theories in which both episodes and abstract representations playa role.Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that word identification is facilitated on the second presentation of a word. This phenomenon, known as repetition priming (or savings), occurs in a variety of tasks believed to involve word identification processes. I Repetition speeds lexical decisions (e.g., Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977), word naming (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1979), and the reading of sentences (e.g., Kolers & Ostry, 1974) and longer text (e.g., Kolers, 1976). Repeated words are also more likely to be correctly identified on a perceptual identification test, in which a word is shown for a very brief duration before being masked (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981).There has been considerable disagreement about the nature of repetition priming in word identification tasks. At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the effect ofrepetition on word identification is mediated by abstract representations, by specific episodic representations, or both. The goal of this paper is to provide a critical review of the evidence relevant to this question.Distinctions between general and specific information have provoked lively discussions throughout the field of cognitive psychology. General and specific knowledge are often assumed to be used for different purposes and to be very different in nature as well. Two types of distinctions between general and specific information have been made. First, general knowledge of facts and skills Preparation of this paper was partially supported by a Summer Research Stipend from Loyola University of Chicago. I thank Kim Kirsner, Betty Ann Levy, 1. W. Whitlow, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful reviews. I am especially grateful to Jim Neely for numerous valuable comments. I also thank Gordon Logan for helpful e-mail discussions. Finally, thanks to Ed Shoben for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Correspondence should be addressed to P. L. Tenpenny, Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626 (e-mail: ptenpen@luc.edu).has been distinguished from specific knowledge of episodes in which those facts and skills are learned or used. Tulving (1972), for example, proposed that semantic and episodic information are stored ...

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“…Chicago, 1994 The conceptual meaning hypothesis was developed to address contextual manipulations such as those created by relatedness priming in lexical decision, in which a change in a prime's meaning results in little or no facilitation (Bainbridge, Lewandowsky, & Kirsner, 1993;Lewandowsky, Kirsner, & Bainbridge, 1989;Masson & Freedman, 1990). In other words, facilitation due to repetition will be reduced if the conceptual meaning is not instantiated on each occurrence.…”

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confidence: 99%

A transfer analysis of the repetition effect in the lexical and ambiguity decision tasks

Gorfein

Bubka

1997

Psychon Bull Rev

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Two experiments were performed in an attempt to evaluate explanations of repetition primingthe facilitation observed when the same word is processed a second time in the same task. One task employed was lexical decision (wordlnonword) and the other was ambiguity decision (ambiguous/unambiguous). In the first experiment, transfer on a lexical decision task was measured following either a lexical decision or an ambiguity decision. When the identical lists were processed in the first phase for lexical and ambiguity decision, equal repetition effects were obtained on lexical decision. However, when the ambiguity task was presented without nonwords, no repetition priming occurred. In a second experiment, the within-task repetition effect was large for the ambiguity decision, whereas no transfer was obtained from lexical decision to ambiguity decision. The results were interpreted as being consistent with a transfer-appropriate processing account of repetition priming.

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Context effects in repetition priming are sense effects

Cited by 32 publications

References 40 publications

Form-specific visual priming for new associations in the right cerebral hemisphere

Form-specific visual priming for new associations in the right cerebral hemisphere

Abstractionist versus episodic theories of repetition priming and word identification

A transfer analysis of the repetition effect in the lexical and ambiguity decision tasks

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