For much of the relatively short history of computational interfaces, designers have emphasized the importance of naturalism and its place in aiding ease of exchange between humans and computers. In the musings and applications of Donald Norman (1990), Allan Kay (1990), and a generation of human-computer interaction (HCI) thinkers and engineers throughout the 1980s, the desired aim for human-computer interaction was the erasure of a physical and existential space that maintained the distinction between computation and human agents. Many of these early currents in HCI fell into two camps in their approaches to, for example, the centrality of interfaces in computation. On the one hand, an interface such as a GUI was seen-and has increasingly been involved in web design, for example-as the location to imagistically instantiate representations of the 'intuitive' actions and perceptions of humans with metaphors from the backend of computational processes (see for example, Kay 1990). On the other hand, beginning with Kay's critique of the GUI (1990, 210), the visible interface has often been seen as something that should be progressively erased. However, what was common to and continues to persist as the key vector to conceiving the relation of computation to human action and perception is that the space of engagement across, between, or amid computer and human requires naturalizing.