Contested water rights

Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans‐Peter

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.007

Cited by 55 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Though these extreme principles are not often invoked in practice, agents' claims are often larger than their endowments, as illustrated for instance by Egypt's large claim to water in the Nile river basin. Agents' overlapping claims to river water make water a contested resource (Ansink and Weikard 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Ansink

Weikard

2011

Soc Choice Welf

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Ansink

Weikard

2011

Soc Choice Welf

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In absence of well-defined property rights, it may be hard for countries to agree on implementing a more efficient allocation by trade or agreement, since such a move would implicitly assign such property rights (Holden and Thobani, 1996;Ansink and Weikard, 2009). …”

Section: Property Rights In the Rivermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also, by satisfying desirable axioms, solutions are more likely to be acceptable to the countries involved. Such procedures can either be implemented by the negotiating countries themselves, by the members of a joint river basin committee, or perhaps even by a third party that is called in to support countries in their negotiations on river water (Ansink and Weikard, 2009). …”

Section: Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

Ansink

Houba

2014

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…As a result of increasing population and developing economies, the need for water is growing immensely. The principal issue is to have an efficient and fair allocation of resources (Ansink and Weikard 2009;Hoekstra 2006). Some other examples are aid relief during natural disasters (Özdamar et al 2004), common property fisheries (İlkılıç 2011), and the distribution of utilities like electricity and natural gas when there is a supply shock.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allocation rules on networks

İlkılıç

Kayı

2014

Soc Choice Welf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and a citizen depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the citizen. Given the endowments at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on resource monotonic and anonymous bilateral principles satisfying a regularity condition and extend these principles to allocation rules on networks. We require the extension to preserve the essence of the bilateral principle for each pair of citizens in the network. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the bilateral principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each bilateral principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust (Theorem 1). Next, we consider a Rawlsian criteria of distributive justice and show that there is a unique "Rawls fair" rule that equals the extension given by the algorithm (Theorem 2). Pairwise robustness and Rawlsian fairness are two sides of the same coin, the former being a pairwise and the latter a global requirement on the allocation given by a rule. We also show as a corollary that any parametric principle can be extended to an allocation rule (Corollary 1). Finally, we give applications of the algorithm for the egalitarian, the proportional, and the contested garment bilateral principles (Example 1).

show abstract

Contested water rights

Cited by 55 publications

References 31 publications

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

The Economics of Transboundary River Management

Allocation rules on networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About