Contest architecture

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.004

Cited by 306 publications

(206 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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201

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“…The central concern in much of this literature is exploring how solvers can be induced to provide good solutions on average (Krishna andMorgan 1997, Moldovanu andSela 2001). That being said, there is some research (e.g., Moldovanu and Sela 2006) that focuses also on the best entry's performance.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Mihm

Schlapp

2015

SSRN Journal

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Contests, in which contestants compete for a prize offered by a contest holder, have become a popular way to source innovation. Despite great interest from the academic community, many important managerial aspects of contests have received very little formal inquiry. The most important of these is feedback from the contest holder to the contestants while the contest unfolds. This paper sets out to establish a comprehensive understanding of how to give feedback in a contest by answering the questions of when to give feedback and when not to give feedback and which type of feedback to give, public (which all solvers can observe) or private (which only the concerned party can observe). We find that feedback will not affect the behavior of competing problem solvers unless the contest holder credibly precommits to a truthful feedback policy. We then set up a framework that reduces the feedback decision to a pair of conceptual questions. First: Is the contest's ultimate objective to increase average quality or to find the best solution? Second: How uncertain are outcomes for the solvers? We show that no feedback or public feedback generally dominate private feedback. However, if the host is interested exclusively in the best performance and if the contest displays large uncertainties, private feedback is optimal.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Mihm

Schlapp

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…Some general insights to the problem were provided by Moldovanu and Sela (2001;2006) and references therein, advocating for some discriminatory features of contests.…”

Section: The Regulator' S Optimal Choice Of Allocationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When there is no individual-speci…c noise involved in the observation of …rms'actions, one can implement a rank-order contest, which is, in e¤ect, a multi-prize allpay auction (Glazer and Hassin 1988;Barut and Kovenock 1998;Clark and Riis 1998;Moldovanu and Sela 2001;2006). This di¤ers from tournaments as agents in rank-order contest models are generally assumed to have a deterministic relationship between e¤ort and actions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using contests to allocate pollution rights

2009

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In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market. We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that distributes permits to …rms based on their rank relative to other …rms. This ranking is achieved by ordering …rms based on an observable 'external action'where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the …rm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. We argue that this mechanism has a number of bene…ts over auctioning and grandfathering. Using this mechanism e¢ ciently distributes permits, allows for the attainment of a secondary policy objective and has the potential to be more politically appealing than existing alternatives.

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“…Moldovanu and Sela [19] analyze (amongst others) the question of whether a contest should be split into several sub-contests in a situation of private pre-decision information. They prove that for linear or convex cost functions, the grand contest generates a higher expected output than any contest divided into subgroups of equal size (ibid., Theorem 1).…”

Section: Contest Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The coefficients in (19) are the expected values of the likelihood ratio order statistics under the exponential distribution with mean 1. The cost minimizing prize structure is given by w 1 = 0, w 2 = (6/7) 2 and w 3 = (18/7) 2 .…”

Section: Optimal Reward Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Information in tournaments under limited liability

Budde

2009

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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show abstract

Contest architecture

Cited by 306 publications

References 17 publications

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Using contests to allocate pollution rights

Information in tournaments under limited liability

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