Content in Simple Signalling Systems

Abstract

Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content is important. This article shows that this concept can be made precise by defining a notion of functional content that captures the degree to which different states of the world are involved in stabilizing senders’ and receivers’ use of a signal at equilibrium. A series of case studies is used to contrast functional content with informational content, and to illustrate the explanatory role and limitations of this definition of functional content. 1 Introduction2 Modelling Framework3 Two Kinds of Content 3.1 Informational content 3.2 Functional content4 Cases 4.1 Case 1: Simplest case 4.2 Case 2: Partial pooling 4.3 Case 3: Bottleneck 4.4 Case 4: Partial common interest 4.5 Case 5: Deception 4.6 Case 6: A further problem arising from divergent interests5 DiscussionAppendix

Consequences of a Functional Account of Information

“…We can de-emphasise both simultaneously by bringing out the equally significant instructional or imperative aspect of information and its potential user's action. In line with recent work on subpersonal content, epistemic metaphors are displaced [47,4].…”

“…A growing (perhaps by now established) trend in naturalistic epistemology is the use of a concept of content that does not require personal-level intentional states. Its value lies in its explanatory role describing the behaviour of organisms and artificial devices too simple to be ascribed personalities [30,47]. The classic example of this move is Skyrms's appropriating of Lewis's analysis of content in game-theoretic models [49].…”

“…Like all orthodoxy this view has been disputed [44]. However, it is strongly theoretically supported [28,32,34,33] and recent formal work seeks to justify it in light of Skyrms's treatment [5,47]. To repeat, the traditional view that natural signs do not have correctness conditions is supported by 16 the teleosemantic approach to intentionality, on which having a function is necessary for having a correctness condition.…”

Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

“…29 And suppose that the sender adopts the following signaling strategy: S1 → M1 S2 → M2 S3 → M2 In other words, it is as if the Terrestrial female says, "I am Terrestrial," while the Amphibious and Purely Aquatic females both say, "I am either Amphibious or Purely Aquatic." The receiver's best response to this strategy is to adopt the following strategy:…”

“…Given the receiver's strategy, the sender could do better by sending M1 even 29 The sender may not have had time yet to develop the capacity to send more than two different signals. 30 The male may not initially realize that the Amphibious female lies sometimes.…”