Contending Interpretations of Bentham's Utilitarianism

Abstract

This article illustrates the contours of the continuing debate over Bentham's utilitarianism through an analysis of the secondary literature. It assesses the persuasiveness of the principal contemporary “authoritarian” (despotic, totalitarian, collectivism behaviouralist, constructivist, panopticist and paternalist) and “individualist” (facilitative and liberal) interpretations of Bentham's thought, indicating where they are consistent with his writings and where they are not. Distinctions and conflicts between contending perspectives are found to be rooted in a reliance on different elements of Bentham's vast corpus and emphasis on different components of his utilitarian theory. An examination of the contending perspectives underscores the tensions in Bentham's thought, including the most characteristic tension between, on the one hand, the axiomatic commitment to the individual and, on the other hand, the greatest happiness principle.

Reviewing the Concept of Notary Civil Partnership in Indonesian Legal Arrangement

“…Bentham's theory focuses on expediency (Crimmins, 1996). The theory of utilitarianism is rational because it always demands that every existing regulation must be accounted for based on its benefits for as many people as possible, otherwise a regulation that does not have benefits for as many people should be eliminated (Brink, 1986).…”

Utility contra utilitarianism: Holbach’s international ethics

“…This will be repeated in a slightly different format in Politique Naturelle (1773), where Holbach claims that whatever the form of government, it ‘will be good when it will bring happiness to the greatest number’ (d’Holbach [1773a] 2001: 382). This reference to the greatest number formula, however, never translates itself into a rational calculation of interests (Crimmins, 1996: 754). This is primarily because it is not rationality that grounds our interests in Holbach’s thought, but our self-love coupled with our natural sociability.…”

An Expert at Work: Revisiting Jeremy Bentham's Proposals on Codification

“…This said, and as Frey and Stutzer correctly point out, the problems inherent with an analysis based on an aggregate welfare function remain. From a historical point of view, on the other hand, it is awkward for those who believe they are following Bentham that Bentham's utilitarianism has been subject to differing interpretations (see, for example, Crimmins 1996). At the same time, the ambiguity involved in the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’ principle, which Bentham himself came to realize late in his life, also makes it hard to pinpoint Bentham on a precise measure of ‘utilitarianism’ as a guide to policy (Goldworth 1969; see also Bentham's cryptic ‘Article on Utilitarianism’, originally dating from 1829, and re‐edited in Bentham 1983b).…”