Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

Boucher, Matthieu; Cooper, Christopher A.

doi:10.1177/1478929919847132

Cited by 15 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…To some, therefore, the issue arising from the careers of MAs is not that they are part of a detached political class but, rather, that they can use insights and skills – ‘specialized human capital’ (Parker et al, 2012) – acquired while serving in public office to obtain high positions outside of politics. This so-called revolving-door problem captures the practice of former politicians migrating to jobs where the insights, networks and other resources they have obtained in high-octane politics can give their new employers a competitive advantage (Boucher and Cooper, 2019; Parker et al, 2012; Selling and Svallfors, 2019). For example, politicians are cognisant that external actors can effectively influence government decisions about subsidies, procurement and regulation (Cohen, 1986).…”

Section: Career Perspectives On Ministerial Advisorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholarship utilizing a career rewards perspective has shown that monetary and visible rewards for high public office 'do not extinguish with [the] end of tenure but rather provide new credentials which expand [politicians'] ability to fulfil their career ambitions' (Claveria and Verge, 2015: 819; see also Brans and Peters, 2014). The potential revolving-door problem refers to former politicians migrating to jobs where their insights entail a competitive advantage for employers (Boucher and Cooper, 2019;Parker et al, 2012;Selling and Svallfors, 2019).). However, little is known about what aspects of their work in the core of executive government make MAs attractive to outside employers (Hustedt et al, 2017;Wilson, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Public Office as a Stepping-Stone? Investigating the Careers of Ministerial Advisors

Askim

Karlsen

Kolltveit

2020

Political Studies Review

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Ministerial advisors have become an essential aspect of executive branches worldwide, thus making the ministerial advisor office a potential route for young politicians aspiring to an expanding political class. The article studies which professions ministerial advisors migrate to following their ministerial careers, how ministerial advisors’ post-ministerial careers compare to their pre-ministerial careers, and if the variance in careers can be explained by the resources that ministerial advisors obtain while in government. Empirically, the article draws on a cohort of 139 ministerial advisors in Norwegian governments between 2001 and 2009; it covers positions in the political sphere and the public, private and voluntary occupational sectors over a period from each ministerial advisor’s youth to the end of 2017. The bibliographic data are combined with surveys and elite interviews. The results show that more than expanding the political class as a recruitment ground for future Members of the Parliament and ministers, ministerial advisor appointments serve as stepping-stones to careers outside of politics. Most ministerial advisors experience shifts between occupational sectors and upwards to higher positions. However, ministerial advisors’ attractiveness in the labour market is surprisingly unaffected by what they actually did in office; rather, it rests on resources such as insider knowledge and networks.

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Section: Career Perspectives On Ministerial Advisorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Office as a Stepping-Stone? Investigating the Careers of Ministerial Advisors

Askim

Karlsen

Kolltveit

2020

Political Studies Review

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“…In particular, EU consultancy research might engage with the burgeoning debate that addresses the role of consultants to IGs. If buying access is not the key motivator, to what extent do other factors, namely the need for information on political processes or policy expertise drive consultancy hiring (Boucher and Cooper, 2019; Lapira, 2017).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Huwyler

2020

European Union Politics

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Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of hiring consultancies is linked to membership promotion. For firms, it likely relates to their need for specialised lobbying tools and trust-building measures when seeking private goods from policy-makers. Furthermore, the results indicate that consultancy hiring by business interest groups becomes less likely the more they focus on lobbying. This moderation effect highlights that business interest groups show awareness of principal–agent problems and take mitigating action.

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“…American research (LaPira and Thomas 2017) suggests that whereas in-house lobbyists tend to be experts on a particular issue, and form stable relationships with government agencies as they lobby on the same issue over time, consultant lobbyists are better described as "well-connected chameleons," selling access to government personnel to any interested party. Using the registry, Boucher and Cooper (2019) investigate whether this description of consultant lobbyists applies to Canada, and find a more complex story playing out. Although the majority of consultant lobbyists behave in ways consistent with being issue experts, a sizeable minority contact public office holders across a vast range of policy sectors and maintain enduring relationships with "moving" public office holders-which is consistent with selling access as connectionpeddling generalists.…”

Section: What Characteristics Define Lobbyists? What Are Lobbyists' Objectives?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying and governance in Canada

Boucher¹,

Cooper²

2021

Can Public Adm

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In one of earliest empirical studies of lobbying in Canada, Robert Presthus remarked with surprise that some MPs believed that "'lobbying' just did not exist in Canada" (1971: 445). Now, more than fifty years since Presthus' study, not even the most passive onlooker of politics would dare deny the existence of lobbying in Canada, nor for that matter, dismiss lobbying as an inconsequential component of governing. Yet, despite this, lobbying continues to be relatively overlooked by Canadian scholars, especially compared to our American and European peers.Historically, to the extent that lobbying received scholars' attention, it was indirect: done by those studying interest groups and concerned with classic debates of pluralism and the concentration of power within Canada's Westminster political system (Pross 1986;Coleman 1987). This dearth of research can be explained partly by lobbying's highly clandestine nature. Until the 1990s scholars had little empirical material to examine other than interviews; a method, which, because of the unflattering reputation lobbying tends to receive, faced challenges in recruitment and social desirability bias. This began to change in 1989 when the federal government adopted its first lobbying legislation. Although minimally constraining, this legislation was an important step in recognizing and seeking to regulate lobbying activity. As Pross and Shepherd (2017) show, this action led to the diffusion of similar, but non-uniform, legislation among the provinces. Scholars have studied this legislation (Hudon and Yates 2008; Yates and Beauchamps 2008;Yates 2018), investigating its political motivations and objectives, as well as its effect on the public's perception of lobbying, and lobbyists' relationships with government personnel.Over time, the federal rules overseeing lobbying have continued to evolve. The most important change took place in 2008 following the adoption of the Federal Accountability Act, which introduced a new Lobbying Act alongside more strict and systematic disclosure rules. The new Lobbying Act, which made Canada a world leader in lobbying regulation (Chari et al. 2019), requires lobbyists to file a report "when oral and arranged communication has occurred between the lobbyist and a designated public office holder" (R.S.C. C-44, 1985). Each report states whether the lobbyist is a consultant or an inhouse lobbyist, the name of the consultant lobbyist (if applicable), the name

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Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

Cited by 15 publications

References 57 publications

Public Office as a Stepping-Stone? Investigating the Careers of Ministerial Advisors

Public Office as a Stepping-Stone? Investigating the Careers of Ministerial Advisors

Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies

Lobbying and governance in Canada

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