Construing counterfactual worlds: The role of abstraction

Abstract

The present article conceptualizes mental time travel as a special case of transcending psychological distance, which rests on the uniquely human ability to consider counterfactual and hypothetical worlds. We discuss the possible challenges that counterfactuality and futurity present before our cognitive system, which include severing the real from imagined worlds and dealing with uncertainty. We suggest, similar to extant approaches to theory of mind, that the use of abstract–symbolic mental representations helps overcome these difficulties. We present empirical evidence to support the claim that counterfactual and hypothetical objects are encoded in a more abstract manner than ascertained objects. Finally, we discuss the possible advantages of linguistic/disembodied representation over the embodied–experiential form. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The language of future-thought: An fMRI study of embodiment and tense processing

“…However, when these actions were negated (e.g., "do not push the button"), motor activation decreased. Negated events, like future ones, describe non-factual world-states and thus should not call upon the same sensory-motor systems with which we encounter reality (Gilead et al, 2012). The present results join this previous work (e.g., Tettamanti et al, 2008;Tomasino et al, 2010) in suggesting that the invocation of concrete/embodied representations is not mandatory, as initially suggested (Hauk et al, 2004), but rather that it is part of a more intricate process by which meaning is construed.…”

“…4 Despite the similarities between past-and future-thought, it is self-evident that they are not one of the same. It is an absolute necessity for cognitive agents to sharply distinguish between factual (past and present) and hypothetical (future) events (Gilead et al, 2012). It appears that due to the grave importance of this distinction, the factual/hypoethical (or realis/irrealis) dimension permeates the inner-substrates of our language (Pinker, 2007) and as the current study shows, is reflected in the way our brains process meaning.…”

“…This remarkable ability to conjure up imagined worlds requires us to somehow segregate representations of the factual and the hypothetical (Gilead et al, 2012); because our neural perceptual modules are primarily concerned with the task of accurately discovering factual reality, the reactivation of concrete sensorial images might be ill-suited when construing the meaning of hypothetical (rather than factual) actions.…”

“…The recruitment of the neural systems used for the processing of factual reality (i.e., events that have occurred or are occurring right now) might be problematic when thinking of future events, which are non-factual in nature, since it could lead to confusion between actual action and intention. In light of this, we recently proposed that future-thought might require a mental segregation of factual from hypothetical representations by means of reducing the extent of sensorimotor details (Gilead et al, 2012). Consequently, our first prediction was that the processing of factual (past and present) sentences would differ from that of hypothetical (future) sentences, with regards to the degree of concreteness-related processes that they evoke.…”

TEST: A Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of Cognition

“…In a similar vein, we do not propose that all concepts are necessarily simulated or that all representations require the same amount of simulation. A number of recent theoretical proposals emphasize the need for multiple representational systems, including both embodied and “dis‐embodied” (i.e., abstract) concepts (e.g., Barsalou, ; Dove, ; Gilead, Liberman, & Maril, ; Louwerse & Connell, ; Markman & Brendl, ; Wilson, ). The question of what abstraction is with regard to simulation is very important; here, however, we simply follow the working hypothesis that the required degree of simulation can be viewed as inversely related to the required degree of abstraction: A more automated and engrained representation requires less and/or more shallow simulation for adequate retrieval, thereby implying higher degrees of abstraction (e.g., Chatterjee, ; Johnson, ; Tucker, ).…”