Constructive anthropomorphism: a functional evolutionary approach to the study of human-like cognitive mechanisms in animals

Abstract

Anthropomorphism, the attribution of human cognitive processes and emotional states to animals, is commonly viewed as non-scientific and potentially misleading. This is mainly because apparent similarity to humans can usually be explained by alternative, simpler mechanisms in animals, and because there is no explanatory power in analogies to human phenomena when these phenomena are not well understood. Yet, because it is also difficult to preclude real similarity and continuity in the evolution of humans' and animals’ cognitive abilities, it may not be productive to completely ignore our understanding of human behaviour when thinking about animals. Here we propose that in applying a functional approach to the evolution of cognitive mechanisms, human cognition may be used to broaden our theoretical thinking and to generate testable hypotheses. Our goal is not to ‘elevate’ animals, but rather to find the minimal set of mechanistic principles that may explain ‘advanced’ cognitive abilities in humans, and consider under what conditions these mechanisms were likely to enhance fitness and to evolve in animals. We illustrate this approach, from relatively simple emotional states, to more advanced mechanisms, involved in planning and decision-making, episodic memory, metacognition, theory of mind, and consciousness.

Anti-anthropomorphism and Its Limits

“…It is, therefore, matter of elucidate how a kind of “middle way” could work and bring together, on the one side, the idea that anthropomorphism is literally wrong and, on the other side, the fact that it seems to be a natural and productive way of thinking. Arbilly and Lotem ( 2017 ) argue for a similar claim by their “constructive anthropomorphism.” With their words: “We believe that the natural tendency of using our human experiences when thinking about animals (i.e., the tendency to anthropomorphize) can actually be harnessed productively to generate hypotheses regarding cognitive mechanisms and their evolution” (p. 2). In a similar way, the rationale of our proposal is to sketch out the main advantages to extend to possibility of this idea to the three areas above mentioned.…”

“…It is matter of a fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2007 ; Gigerenzer et al, 2011 ), which is actually able in everyday circumstances to easily find a way to categorize what is going on in the environment, like in the case you have suddenly to interpret the behavior of a threatening dog in the streets. Furthermore, anthropomorphism works as a matrix to generate hypotheses on cognitive functions and their evolutionary history (Arbilly and Lotem, 2017 ). But, finally, we (both as scientists and common people) have to keep out to overestimate the presence of human psychological features into inanimate things and in other species.…”

Humans as a model for understanding biological fundamentals

“…While she acknowledges that 'putting oneself in another organism's shoes' can act as a useful hypothesis generator, she at the same time warns against taxonomic chauvinism and suggests that looking at the natural world through a human lens may hinder scientific progress, especially for traits for which humans are outliers. Interestingly, at the same time Arbilly & Lotem [34] argue explicitly against a priori separating human from nonhuman animals. In their contribution, they argue for the utility of what they call 'scientific anthropomorphism', or using what we know about human behaviour as the foundation of initial hypotheses regarding apparently similar behaviours in other species.…”

Humans as model organisms

“…There continues to be intense debate on the extent to which human cognitive organization is modular (contrast [40,41]), and on the extent to which computational models of cognitive processes are productive and explanatory (contrast [42,43]). Arbilly & Lotem [38] attempt to escape from this problem in part by considering psychological phenomena that are not, prima facie, psychologically complex (like hunger), and in part by giving rather deflationary accounts of the supposedly complex cognitive phenomenon in question.…”

“…Second, to the extent that the project does succeed in showing that target cognitive competences depend on early evolving, phylogenetically widespread associationist mechanisms, it is no longer clear that the investigatory dogleg through the human examples adds to the explanatory project. So, for example, in discussing decision-making, planning and language, Arbilly & Lotem [38] point out that the behavioural demands on animals are often complex, and call for controlled activity, timed to the right time and place, and with little margin of error. Given this, it is certainly appropriate for behavioural ecologists to identify contexts in which we would expect selection for planning, for the control of complex motor sequences and for representing categories functionally rather than sensorily.…”