PurposeThe promotion of new energy vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve low carbon emission reduction. This paper aims to investigate the optimal pricing of automotive supply chain members in the context of dual policy implementation while considering consumers' low-carbon preferences.Design/methodology/approachThis article takes manufacturers, retailers and consumers in a main three-level supply chain as the research object. Stackelberg game theory is used as the theoretical guidance. A game model in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower is established. The author also considered the impact of carbon tax policies, subsidy policies and consumer preferences on the results. Furthermore, the author investigates the optimal decision-making problem under the profit maximization model.FindingsThrough model solving, it is found that the pricing of EVs is positively correlated with the unit price of carbon and the amount of subsidies. The following conclusions can be obtained by numerical analysis of each parameter. Changes in carbon prices have a greater impact on conventional gasoline vehicles. Based on the numerical analysis of parameter β, it is also found that when the government subsidizes consumers, supply chain members will increase their prices to obtain partial subsidies. Compared with retailers, low-carbon preferences have a greater impact on manufacturers.Research limitations/implicationsThe new energy automobile industry involves many policies, including tax cuts, tax exemptions and subsidies. The policy environment faced by the members of a supply chain is complex and diverse. Therefore, the analysis in this article is based only on partial policies.Originality/valueThe authors innovatively combine the three factors of subsidy policy, carbon tax policy and consumer low-carbon preference, with research on the pricing of EVs. The influence of policy factors and consumer preferences on the pricing of EVs is studied.