1991
DOI: 10.1093/0198239750.001.0001
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Constructibility and Mathematical Existence

Abstract: A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention t… Show more

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Cited by 39 publications
(41 citation statements)
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“…I argue that even given the sort of explanation most favorable to such inference, typical explanations of physical facts involving mathematics do not commit us to mathematical objects. As such the position will be consistent with antirealist views that understand mathematical truths as modal claims of possibility, in line with the suggestion of Putnam (2012), and the accounts proposed by Chihara (1990) and Hellman (1989).…”
Section: Baker's Indispensability Argument and Strategies Of Responsesupporting
confidence: 83%
“…I argue that even given the sort of explanation most favorable to such inference, typical explanations of physical facts involving mathematics do not commit us to mathematical objects. As such the position will be consistent with antirealist views that understand mathematical truths as modal claims of possibility, in line with the suggestion of Putnam (2012), and the accounts proposed by Chihara (1990) and Hellman (1989).…”
Section: Baker's Indispensability Argument and Strategies Of Responsesupporting
confidence: 83%
“…But note that some systems with non-standard logical terms, e.g., first-order logic with the quantifier "there exist uncountably many," are also complete. (See Keisler [19] Thus, take a simple interpreted language, Z, and consider the following three inference schemata of Z: (6) a is yellow (all yellow); therefore, a is not red, where a is to be replaced by an individual term of Z. To distinguish necessary from non-necessary inferences of Z, the apparatus of models for Z has to be constructed in such a way that all instances of (6) and (8) preserve truth in all models while some instances of (7) do not.…”
Section: Does (5) Hold In Standard Semantics?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Over the last century, a variety of schools and point of views has seen rise about the meaning of existence, definability and conceivability of mathematical objects (Field 1980;Chihara 1990;Burgess and Rosen 1997;Lakoff and Nunez 2000). A much-debated object is that of a "number" (Benacerraf 1965;Frege 1983).…”
Section: Defining and Building New Objects: A Common Foundational Conmentioning
confidence: 99%