Construal level and free will beliefs shape perceptions of actors' proximal and distal intent

Abstract

Two components of lay observers' calculus of moral judgment are proximal intent (the actor's mind is focused on performing the action) and distal intent (the actor's mind is focused on the broader goal). What causes observers to prioritize one form of intent over the other? The authors observed whether construal level (Studies 1–2) and beliefs about free will (Studies 3–4) would influence participants' sensitivity to the actor's proximal vs. distal intent. In four studies, participants read scenarios in which the actor's proximal and distal intent were independently manipulated. In Study 1, when only distal intent was present in the actor's mind, participants rated the psychologically distant actor more responsible than the psychologically near actor. In Study 2, when only distal intent was in the actor's mind, participants with a chronic high level of action identification rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low level of action identification. In both studies, when only proximal intent was in the actor's mind, construal level did not predict judgments of responsibility. In Study 3, when only proximal intent was present in the actor's mind, the more participants believed in free will, the more they rated the actor responsible. When only distal intent was in the actor's mind, free will belief did not influence ratings of responsibility. In Study 4, the same pattern emerged when free will/determinism beliefs were manipulated and the actor performed a positive (life-saving) act. The authors discuss how these results shed new light on the literatures on moral reasoning and psycho-legal theory.

Construal Level Theory and Moral Judgments: How Thinking Abstractly Modifies Morality

“…In addition to the aforementioned studies, five studies also found effects of variables moderating the effect of abstract thinking on moral judgments, namely gender (Agerström, Björklund, & Allwood, 2010), social motivation (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, & Leder, 2010;Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008), concerns about fairness and political ideology (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012), and intentionality (Plaks & Robinson, 2015).…”

“…While some of the studies have been cautious enough to include measures or manipulations of both construal level and psychological distance (i.e., Agerström et al, 2010Eyal et al, 2014;Gong & Medin, 2012;Lammers, 2012;Plaks & Robinson, 2015;Žeželj & Jokić, 2014a), other studies have generalized their results brought by one kind of construct to also apply to the other (e.g., psychological distance to construal level). Potentially, characteristics of participants and/or the setting of the experiment allowed for a larger congruency between construal level and psychological distance in cases where both constructs led to the same results.…”

“…Intentionality was expected to have an effect based on the theoretical notion that moral responsibility depends on level of intentionality (Reeder, 2009) and the theory of distal and proximal intent (Plaks et al, 2009). Plaks and Robinson (2015) showed that in the high-level construal condition, participants judged actors with a distal intent (focus on the broader goal) as being more responsible, relative to those in the low-level construal condition. This finding suggests that the relationship between construal level and moral judgments depends on whether the actor that is judged is perceived to perform with a distal or proximal intent in mind.…”

“…A last moderator that has been investigated is intentionality (Plaks & Robinson, 2015). Intentionality was expected to have an effect based on the theoretical notion that moral responsibility depends on level of intentionality (Reeder, 2009) and the theory of distal and proximal intent (Plaks et al, 2009).…”

“…Other individual differences that interact with construal level and moral judgment are gender (Agerström et al, 2010), concerns about fairness and political ideology (Luguri et al, 2012), and intentionality (Plaks & Robinson, 2015). Notably, individual differences in cognitive flexibility may also play an important role in moral judgment, as Lammers (2012) found that heightened cognitive flexibility leads to increased moral hypocrisy.…”