Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip

doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1860

Cited by 181 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…This pattern may be caused by strategic behavior if students apply to schools that they like, and, as a safety option, rank last a school in which they have a higher admissions chance. For instance, Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2010) present laboratory evidence that a constraint on rank-order lists encourages students to rank safer options. However, it may also be fully consistent with truth-telling.…”

Section: B Behavioral Assumptions On Rankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Abdulkadiroğlu

Agarwal²,

Pathak³

2017

American Economic Review

113

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In recent years, market design theory has inspired dramatic changes in how children are assigned to public schools across numerous American cities and around the world. The first new system adopted was for placing eighth graders into high schools in New York City (NYC). NYC's new system has not only received widespread scientific and popular acclaim (Economic Sciences Prize Committee 2012; Tullis 2014; Roth 2015), but also became a template for reforms in other cities. 1 Despite widespread adoption of and apparent consensus on the value of market-design-inspired

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Section: B Behavioral Assumptions On Rankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Abdulkadiroğlu

Agarwal²,

Pathak³

2017

American Economic Review

113

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“…Anecdotal evidence from Boston (Pathak and Sonmez, 2008) and laboratory experiments (Chen and Sonmez, 2006;Calsamiglia et al, 2010) suggest that strategic behavior may be widespread in manipulable school choice systems. Indeed, our analysis of ranking behavior for admissions into public elementary schools in Cambridge indicates significant gaming.…”

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confidence: 99%

Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism

Agarwal

Somaini

2014

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Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms. We show that preferences are non-parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter. We then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to Cambridge. Estimates suggest that while 82% of students are assigned to their stated first choice, only 72% are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools. Assuming that students behave optimally, the Immediate Acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0.08 miles. The estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased, and reversed if students report truthfully.

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“…The theoretical properties and disadvantages of DA were studied by Haeringer & Klijn (2009), backed by evidence from laboratory experiments (Calsamiglia et al, 2010) and by practical applications across the world . In addition to advocating DA, the main policy implications of these studies indicate that for an efficiency gain, it is advised to increase the bounds on the number of collected preferences or to abolish the limit on the number of submitted preferences.…”

Section: Matching Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design

Veski¹,

Bíró²,

Põder³

et al. 2017

jMID

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We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality, Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We evaluate seven policy designs based on 2016 admission data in order to understand efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the descriptive data analysis, we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity analysis using computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we vary how the priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors. Different lotteries are included for breaking ties. We find that different ways of considering the same priority factors can have a significant aggregate effect on the allocation. Additionally, we survey a dozen special features that can create significant challenges (both theoretical and practical) in redesigning the

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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Cited by 181 publications

References 16 publications

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism

Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design

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