Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The 'European Clauses' in the National Constitutions: Evolution and Typology

Comparing Constitutional Change in European Union Member States: In Search of a Theory

“…It is noteworthy that four of the original Member States (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) belong to the group of countries most prone to resorting to implicit constitutional change as their preferred method for regulating EU membership. This seems to confirm the results from studies which have focused exclusively on the extent to which national constitutions have been amended to include ‘European clauses’ – namely, that ‘the longer a State participates in European integration, the less extensive the constitutional provisions are on membership’ (Claes, , p. 124).…”

“…The constitutional change required to lay the foundation for Italy's membership in the EU has instead been achieved through implicit constitutional change in the form of a general agreement among judicial and political elites that Article 11 suffices as the grounds for membership in the EU, and that there is no reason to amend the constitution with a provision explicitly referring to European integration. This agreement on how to re‐interpret the meaning of the constitution has been supported by declarations issued by the Italian constitutional court (Claes, , p. 95). Member States like Italy, which lack a constitutional provision serving as the basis for membership, are assigned the value ‘5’ on the variable ‘Constitutional grounds for membership’.…”

“…Of special interest for the current study is the comparative research done by Monica Claes and Anneli Albi on the constitutional amendments made to national constitutions in light of EU membership. These studies (Albi, ; Claes, ) reveal that there are substantial differences when it comes to the extent to which regulations on EU membership are included in constitutional documents. On the one hand, we find EU countries where the constitution is practically void of any mention of the EU (for example, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark) and, on the other, we find countries with fairly extensive constitutional provisions covering various aspects of EU membership (for example, Austria and Germany).…”

“…In contrast to Member States where the constitutional change required to provide the grounds for membership in the EU has been achieved exclusively or predominantly by explicit constitutional change, we find countries where the written constitution does not contain any article which allows for membership in a supranational organization like the EU. Italy, for example, bases its membership on Article 11 of the Italian constitution, which drafters as early as 1947 designed to allow for international co‐operation intended ‘to promote peace and prevent war’ (Claes, , p. 85). A big difference between Italy and Poland is that the Polish amendment was made in 1997, which means that the constitutional drafters were fully aware of the substantial limitations on sovereignty that would follow from membership in an international organization like the EU.…”

The Legacy of the Maastricht‐Urteil and the Pluralist Movement

“…This provision was influenced by the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, in particular the Solange II judgment and the Maastricht-Urteil. 66 When it proposed the amendment, the Swedish government stated that it wanted to make sure that Swedish courts had at least the same powers as German courts with regard to EU law. 67 The Austrian Constitution was also revised upon accession.…”