Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition

Abstract

This paper seeks to estimate the economic growth effect of constitutional provisions for property rights protection. It does so using the unique situation in formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus where all but two introduced new constitutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The effects of implementing different constitutional provisions can therefore be observed in a group of countries with the same formal starting point. Estimates provide no evidence of positive effects and mainly point towards a negative conclusion: the introduction of constitutional protection of property rights is not associated with economic development in the long run, but tends to impose costs during a period of institutional transition and implementation proportional to the constitutional change.

Judicial Independence in the EU A Puzzle

“…This would be in line with Bjørnskov's (2015) observation that constitutional property rights protection in these formerly communist countries was, at best, ineffective.…”

Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa

“…Blume, Müller, & Voigt, 2009, with reference to direct democracy mechanisms; Voigt, Gutmann, & Feld, 2015, concerning constitutional court independence; Chilton & Versteeg, 2017, on the impact of social rights on social spending), whereas others argue that they may actually bring about negative economic consequences (e.g. Bjoernskov, 2015, referring to property rights protection, or Bjoernskov & Mchangama, 2019, concerning adverse effects of protecting some social rights). If it is de facto, not de jure, constitutional rules that matter, an important question arises about the circumstances, in which de facto constitutions deviate from their formal wording.…”

The constitution of ambiguity: The effects of constitutions on economic freedom

“…Acemoglu et al (2005) find that political institutions established prior to 1,500 which check monarchal power correspond to later improvements in property rights protection. Bjørnskov (2015), however, finds that property rights protections explicitly written into the constitutions of post‐Soviet states do not promote de facto property rights protection.…”