Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law 2017
DOI: 10.1017/9781316877135.002
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Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law: Taking Stock, New Perspectives and Looking Ahead

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Cited by 3 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…While the euro-crisis more broadly has been the object of extensive policy and scholarly analysis across a range of disciplines, the legal analysis has focused more on issues of transformation of the European economic 'constitution' or on particular high-profile constitutional encounters and issues before the Court of Justice, exemplified by the challenge to the legality of the Department of Law Working Papers ESM in Pringle 18 or the legality of the ECB's Outright Market Transactions programme in Gauweiler 19 concerning the compatibility of these mechanisms and programmes with EMU law. 20 My focus instead is less on constitutional and EMU-compatibility issues raised by euro-crisis law and more on legal issues raised by the nature of the programmes themselves and legal challenges to the conditionality contained in those programmes.…”
Section: How Liminal Legality Compares With Other Analyses Of Legalitmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the euro-crisis more broadly has been the object of extensive policy and scholarly analysis across a range of disciplines, the legal analysis has focused more on issues of transformation of the European economic 'constitution' or on particular high-profile constitutional encounters and issues before the Court of Justice, exemplified by the challenge to the legality of the Department of Law Working Papers ESM in Pringle 18 or the legality of the ECB's Outright Market Transactions programme in Gauweiler 19 concerning the compatibility of these mechanisms and programmes with EMU law. 20 My focus instead is less on constitutional and EMU-compatibility issues raised by euro-crisis law and more on legal issues raised by the nature of the programmes themselves and legal challenges to the conditionality contained in those programmes.…”
Section: How Liminal Legality Compares With Other Analyses Of Legalitmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The findings show that initial governmental preferences were not challenged by important societal interest groups and that where they were challenged by parliamentary actors, concessions did not affect the original principles of ESM design. The analysis is based on a new EU-wide dataset on political influence in Eurocrisis decision-making, 36 in-depth interviews with non-governmental socio-economic actors and government officials in nine Eurozone countries and data on the role of parliamentary actors from the ‘Constitutional Change through Euro Crisis Law’ (CCECL) project (Beukers et al, 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 3. Reports were accessed in April 2018 and retrieved from the Constitutional Change through Euro Crisis Law (CCECL) project website http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu. The reports were later used as the basis for an edited volume by Beukers et al (2017). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the wake of the Eurocrisis, several studies have examined the question of emergency measures bending the law of the Treaties (see, e.g.,Beukers, 2013;Beukers et al, 2017;Tuori and Tuori, 2014;Hinarejos, 2015;Ioannidis, 2016). What such studies to a large extent share is the notion that 'euro-crisis law' has not bent back, so to speak, but 'become simply the macroeconomic law of the EU'(Beukers et al, 2017, p. 1).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%