Constitution and Qua Objects in the Ontology of Music

Evnine, Simon J.

doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayp015

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Works are essentially created abstract partless objects. Moreover, as Levinson (1980), Rohrbaugh (2005), and Evnine (2009) claim, works are essentially created by their actual composers. For instance, The Creation is essentially created by Haydn.…”

Section: Changementioning

confidence: 99%

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Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Friedell

2018

Philos Stud

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Musical works change. Bruckner revised his Eighth Symphony. Ella Fitzgerald and many other artists have made it acceptable to sing the jazz standard ''All the Things You Are'' without its original verse. If we accept that musical works genuinely change in these ways, a puzzle arises: why can't I change Bruckner's Eighth Symphony? More generally, why are some individuals in a privileged position when it comes to changing musical works and other artifacts, such as novels, films, and games? I give a view of musical works that helps to answer these questions. Musical works, on this view, are created abstract objects with no parts. The paradigmatic changes that musical works undergo are socially determined normative changes in how they should be performed. Due to contingent social practices, Bruckner, but not I, can change how his symphony should be performed. Were social practices radically different, I would be able to change his symphony. This view extends to abstract artifacts beyond music, including novels, films, words, games, and corporations.

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Section: Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are instead two (related) songs that go by the name ''L'chah Dodi.'' Conversely, Rohrbaugh (2003) and Evnine (2009Evnine ( , 2016 think the intrinsic properties of musical works change. They think Bruckner changed his symphony in 1890 instead of composing another one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Friedell

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Similarly, neo-Aristotelians think clay statues are constituted by, but distinct from, their clay. Evnine (2009), inspired by Levinson, thinks when Beethoven indicated s (the Ninth Symphony's sound structure) he made a symphony that was constituted by, but distinct from, s. His account implies vague existence. The reason why is that, for Evnine, constitution doesn't always occur.…”

Section: Neo-aristotelianismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He then claims a similar theory can be developed for musical works. Evnine (2009) reasonably suggests interpreting Levinson as thinking musical works are qua objects. In response, however, Levinson (2013, 56) denies works are qua objects.…”

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confidence: 99%

Music and Vague Existence

Friedell¹

2017

Res Phil.

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I explain a tension between musical creationism (the view that musical works are abstract artifacts) and the view that there is no vague existence. I then suggest ways to reconcile these views. My central conclusion is that, although some versions of musical creationism imply vague existence, others do not. I discuss versions of musical creationism held by Jerrold Levinson, Simon Evnine, and Kit Fine. I also present two new versions. I close by considering whether the tension is merely an instance of a general problem raised by artifacts, both abstract and concrete. I argue that on at least one defensible account of music the tension is especially problematic for abstracta. I focus on musical works, but much of the paper straightforwardly applies to other kinds of abstract artifacts.

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“…More recently, "qua" has been brought up by Kit Fine (1982), 3 and David Wiggins (1980). Colin Marshall (2013) has taken Fine's route in reading Kant, and Simon Evnine (2009) has done likewise in esthetics. Moreover, Ignacio Angelelli (1967a, b), and Philipp Blum (unpublished) too, point to "qua" in the analysis of Frege's notion of sense.…”

Section: The Question Of "As" Some Introductory Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Little Word “as.” On Making Contexts and Aspects Explicit

Werner

2019

Axiomathes

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The word "as" enables one to make contexts and aspects of things explicit while attributing properties or descriptions to them. For example "John is rational as a mathematician"; "John is irrational as a driver." This paper examines the idea according to which all propositions containing "as" should be targeted as potential inferences about the subject; as for the examples given-about John. If the inference is valid-the conception in question holds-one can get rid of "as." I argue against that view by bringing up several contexts in which "as" is not supposed to express an inference. On this basis I come up with a different (non-inferential) typology which does justice, I believe, to ordinary as well as philosophical uses of the little word at stake.

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Constitution and Qua Objects in the Ontology of Music

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Why can’t I change Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony?

Music and Vague Existence

The Little Word “as.” On Making Contexts and Aspects Explicit

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