Constituting the polity, constituting the demos: on the place of the all affected interests principle in democratic theory and in resolving the democratic boundary problem

Owen, David

doi:10.3402/egp.v5i3.18617

Cited by 306 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…For example, I'm bound by the law in Sweden to wear seat belts whenever traveling in a car 29 See e.g., (Sen 1970); (Dworkin 1981a(Dworkin , 2000. 30 See (Miller 2009); (Beckman 2006(Beckman , 2009(Beckman , 2014; (Tännsjö 1992); (Owen 2012); (López-Guerra 2005); and (Dahl 1989). For an extensive discussion of the All Subjected Principle, see (Goodin 2016).…”

Section: Democracy As a Normative Ideal And The All Affected Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratic Boundary Problem Reconsidered

Arrhenius

2023

EP&S

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Section: Democracy As a Normative Ideal And The All Affected Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Democratic Boundary Problem Reconsidered

Arrhenius

2023

EP&S

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“…The plausible decision version of the all-affected principle introduced by Owen (2012) seems to offer a middle way here.…”

Section: The Standard Actual Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ian Shapiro argues that 'if democracy is about structuring power relations so as to limit domination' then 'the claim to a democratic say in collective decisions, whether or not one is a citizen, rests on the causal principle of having a pertinent affected interest' (Shapiro 2003, p. 52). Others have challenged the view that the neo-republican conception of democracy requires inclusion of everyone affected (Owen 2012;Sager 2014). Owen (2012) explicitly challenges Shapiro's view, arguing that democratic inclusion is not the appropriate response to all instances of interference.…”

Section: The All-affected Principle and Non-dominationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, the paper aims to identify a conception of democratic inclusion that is both reasonable and that fits with neo-republicanism. In assessing the reasonableness of principles of democratic inclusion, we take into account recent debates on the all-affected principle and the all-subjected principle (Miller 2009;Näsström 2011;Erman 2014;Valentini 2014;Beckman 2008;Owen 2012). In assessing the fit with neo-republicanism, the picture is less clear-cut as previous writers make conflicting assumptions; some take for granted that freedom of non-domination calls for the inclusion of everyone affected (Schuppert 2014, p. 139;Benton 2014, p. 410), whereas others reason on the premise that only those subject to the state should be included in the neo-republican state (for example Sager 2014;Owen 2014, p. 98).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion

Beckman

Rosenberg

2017

Res Publica

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According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures nondomination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation.

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“…A democratic justification of public power requires participation by 'all those over whom [coercive political power] is exercised' (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 45). The relationship between democratic inclusion and democratic justification is summarized by David Owen's claim that 'all those who are subject to coercively-enforceable law are entitled to inclusion within the demos' (Owen, 2012, p. 146, see also Saunders, 2011.…”

Section: Pure Procedural Democratic Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy

Beckman

2017

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and subversions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making.

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Constituting the polity, constituting the demos: on the place of the all affected interests principle in democratic theory and in resolving the democratic boundary problem

Cited by 306 publications

References 2 publications

The Democratic Boundary Problem Reconsidered

The Democratic Boundary Problem Reconsidered

Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion

Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy

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