Conspiracist cognition: chaos, convenience, and cause for concern

Abstract

There has been much concern with the abundance of misinformation in public discourse.Although misinformation has always played a role in political debate, its character has shifted from support for a specific position to a "shock and chaos" stream of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Exposure to conspiracy theories can have considerable adverse impact on society. I argue that scholars therefore have a responsibility to combat conspiracy theories and misinformation generally. Exercising this responsibility requires an understanding of the varied rhetorical roles of conspiracy theories. Here I focus on instances in which people reject unequivocal scientific evidence and invoke conspiracy theories, or radical anti-institutional positions, based on ideological imperatives. I argue that those positions do not always reflect true attitudes. Instead, people may deploy extreme rhetoric as a pragmatic tool of political expression. I investigate this possibility by focusing on the role of conspiracy theories in the rejection of science. Conspiracist cognition and rhetoric violate the epistemic standards that underpin science. Ironically, this violation of epistemic standards renders conspiracy theories useful as a rationally deployed tool that serves political purposes. I present a study that confirms that conspiracy theories can be deployed to support worldview-motivated denial of science. I provide suggestions how scholars can debunk or defang conspiratorial rhetoric.

Believing in nothing and believing in everything: The underlying cognitive paradox of anti-COVID-19 vaccine attitudes

“…We measured six additional constructs to capture the role of different personal dispositions, which previous research identified as being diagnostic in revealing people's susceptibility to misinformation, conspiracy theories or distrust of official accounts ( Lewandowsky, 2021 ). These scales are 2 : Reliance on Intuition ( Lewandowsky, 2021 ) (five items, Cronbach's α = 0.547), Distrust ( Yamagishi, 1988 ) (six items, Cronbach's α = 0.806) with responses between 1 (“Strongly disagree”) and 5 (“Strongly agree”), Need for Chaos ( Petersen et al, 2018 ) (eleven items, Cronbach's α = 0.842), measuring individuals' wishes to unleash chaos and “burn down” the established political order in hopes of gaining status, and Generic Conspiracist Beliefs ( Brotherton et al, 2013 ) (fifteen items, Cronbach's α = 0.957) with responses between 1 (“Strongly disagree”) and 7 (“Strongly agree”).…”

“…This acceptance bias may well be the cognitive basis for the great difficulty of negating misinformation (for a review see Rapp & Braasch, 2014 ). Ample research shows the grave implications and lingering effects of misinformation, which persist in the face of various correction and inoculation (“pre-bunking”) techniques ( Chan et al, 2017 ; Ecker et al, 2011 ; Gilbert et al, 1990 ; Gilbert et al, 1993 ; Johnson and Seifert, 1994 , Johnson and Seifert, 1998 ; Wilkes & Reynolds, 1999 ), and despite explicit knowledge of misinformation's inaccuracy ( Fazio et al, 2015 ; Gilbert et al, 1993 ; Lewandowsky, 2021 ; Lewandowsky et al, 2012 ) – even if it contradicts factual, a-priori knowledge ( Fazio et al, 2015 ; Rapp, 2016 ). The mere exposure to false information makes subsequent true information seem less real, essentially canceling out the positive effects of the correct information, even if the participant knowingly rejects the false information ( Lewandowsky et al, 2017 ; McCright et al, 2016 ; van der Linden et al, 2017 ).…”

The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction

“…Further complicating matters, the perceived credibility of a source varies across recipients. In extreme cases, people with strong conspiratorial ideation tendencies might mistrust any official source (for example, health authorities) 19,26 . More commonly, people tend to trust sources that are perceived to share their values and worldviews 54,55 .…”

“…Information consumers also have a role to play in combatting misinformation by avoiding contributing to its spread. For instance, people must be aware that they might encounter not only relatively harmless misinformation, such as reporting errors, outdated information and satire, but also disinformation campaigns designed to instil fear or doubt, discredit individuals, and sow division 2,26,223,224 . People must also recognize that disinformation can be psychologically targeted through profit-driven exploitation of personal data and social media algorithms 12 .…”

“…For example, some individuals deny the existence of climate change or reject vaccinations despite being aware of a scientific consensus to the contrary 21,22 . This rejection of science is not the result of mere ignorance but is driven by factors such as conspiratorial mentality, fears, identity expression and motivated reasoning -reasoning driven more by personal or moral values than objective evidence 19,[23][24][25][26] . Thus, to understand the psychology of misinformation and how it might be countered, it is…”