A fundamental question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which cognitive and neural processes are specialised for social behaviour, or are shared with other 'non-social' cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. Here we apply the influential framework of Marr (1982) across research in humans, monkeys, and rodents to propose that information processing can be understood as 'social' or 'non-social' at different levels. We argue that processes can be socially specialised at the implementational and/or the algorithmic level, and that changing the goal of social behaviour can also change social specificity. This framework could provide important new insights into the nature of social behaviour across species, facilitate greater integration, and inspire novel theoretical and empirical approaches.
Social Specificity through the Lens of MarrMany behaviours occur in a social context. Social behaviours, in some form, are exhibited across a surprisingly broad array of species from single-celled microorganisms [1] to rodents [2], fish [3], and primates [4]. However, a core question for psychology and neuroscience is whether there are cognitive processes, brain areas, circuits, or cells that process information in a manner that is socially specific. That is, are there processes that come online only in social situations in a way that is somehow different to what is required for 'non-social' cognitive, motor, and perceptual abilities?We draw on the pioneering idea of Marr's levels (see Glossary) [5] to provide a framework to understand and test whether cognitive and neural processes are socially specialised or not. We argue that a process may be considered 'social' at the algorithmic levelit encodes a specific algorithm or rule that is different from what is being processed in a non-social domainand/or at the implementational level, the same algorithm is used, but it is processed in a different brain area, circuit, or cell. Moreover, we suggest that changing the social goal of the information-processing system (computational level), such as during cooperation or competition, can change social specialisation at the other levels. These levels of description are often overlooked when studying information processing in social contexts. We contend that this can lead to inaccurate conclusions about whether cognitive or neural processes are specialised, and call for a more nuanced approach to the phrase 'the social brain' beyond its simple connotation.