Conservatism and art preferences.

Wilson, Glenn D.; Ausman, James I.; Mathews, Thomas R.

doi:10.1037/h0033972

Cited by 127 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…Conservatives' intolerance of the unfamiliar (Wilson et al, 1973), perceptions of the world as dangerous (Altemeyer, 1998), and fear of loss (Lavine et al, 1999) were reflected in the cautious strategy adopted when playing BeanFest and learning about the novel objects. Liberals demonstrated more openness to new experiences (Jost, 2006) by exploring the new bean world to a greater extent.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, more conservative individuals see the world as involving fewer ''shades of gray" and also are more resolute in their judgments of others. Wilson, Ausman, and Mathews (1973) further suggested that the psychological basis for political ideology may rest in the extent to which individuals fear the unknown. To test this possibility, participants rated a number of paintings that varied along two dimensions: simplicity-complexity and representational-abstract.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation

Shook

Fázio

2009

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

159

149

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation

Shook

Fázio

2009

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

159

149

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Wilson, Ausman, and Mathews (1973) examined the artistic preferences of people who scored high and low on the C-Scale by soliciting evaluative ratings of paintings that had been classified as either simple or complex and either abstract or representational. They found that conservatives exhibited a relatively strong preference for simple rather than complex paintings and a much weaker preference for representational rather than abstract paintings (see Table 5).…”

Section: Uncertainty Avoidancementioning

confidence: 99%

Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

Jost¹,

Glaser²,

Kruglanski³

et al. 2003

Psychological Bulletin

3,665

241

3,177

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Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r ϭ .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine.-George F. Will, BuntsFor more than half a century, psychologists have been tracking the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies underlie ideological differences between the political left and the right. The practice of singling out political conservatives for special study began with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) landmark study of authoritarianism and the fascist potential in personality. An asymmetrical focus on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) was criticized heavily on theoretical and methodological grounds (e.g., Christie, 1954;Eysenck, 1954;Rokeach, 1960;Shils, 1954), but it has withstood the relentless tests of time and empirical scrutiny (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981Altemeyer, , 1988Altemeyer, , 1996Altemeyer, , 1998Billig, 1984;Brown, 1965;Christie, 1991;Elms, 1969;Sidanius, 1985;W. F. Stone, 1980;W. F. Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993;Tetlock, 1984;Wilson, 1973c). A voluminous literature, which we review here, facilitates the comparison of cognitive styles and motivational needs of political conservatives with those of moderates, liberals, radicals, and left-wingers. In addition to classic and contemporary approaches to authoritarianism, we cover less obvious sources of theory and research on individual differences associated with dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, and social dominance orientation (SDO) insofar as each of these psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of political conservatism.The study of authoritarianism and other personality theories of political attitudes is often dismissed a priori as an illegitimate, value-laden attempt to correlate general psychological profiles with specific ideological beliefs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997; J. L. Martin, 2001;Ray, 1988). The psychological study of ideological conservatism is one that invites controversy (e.g., Redding, 2001;Sears, 1994;Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996;Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986;Tetlock, 1994;Tetlock & Mitchell,...

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“…However, we know from previous research that there are ideological differences in cognitive-processing styles that are relevant to social categorization processes, including some differences that should have direct implications for judging sexual orientation in particular. In comparison with liberals, conservatives are less tolerant of ambiguity and complexity (Block & Block, 1951;Jost et al, 2003;Sidanius, 1978;Wilson, Ausman, & Mathews, 1973). Conservatives also show a greater desire to reach certainty and closure on decision-making tasks (Jost et al, 2003;Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999) and rely more heavily on simple rules and heuristics when making judgments (e.g., describing policy options or estimating probabilities with respect to a given person's hobbies; see, e.g., Kemmelmeier, 2010;Tetlock, 1983).…”

Section: Ideological Differences In Cognitive-processing Stylesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of gaydar: Ideological differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation.

Stern

West

Jost

et al. 2013

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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In the present research, we investigated whether, because of differences in cognitive style, liberals and conservatives would differ in the process of categorizing individuals into a perceptually ambiguous group. In 3 studies, we examined whether conservatives were more likely than liberals to rely on gender inversion cues (e.g., feminine = gay) when categorizing male faces as gay vs. straight, and the accuracy implications of differential cue usage. In Study 1, perceivers made dichotomous sexual orientation judgments (gay-straight). We found that perceivers who reported being more liberal were less likely than perceivers who reported being more conservative to use gender inversion cues in their deliberative judgments. In addition, liberals took longer to categorize targets, suggesting that they may have been thinking more about their judgments. Consistent with a stereotype correction model of social categorization, in Study 2 we demonstrated that differences between liberals and conservatives were eliminated by a cognitive load manipulation that disrupted perceivers' abilities to engage in effortful processing. Under cognitive load, liberals failed to adjust their initial judgments and, like conservatives, consistently relied on gender inversion cues to make judgments. In Study 3, we provided more direct evidence that differences in cognitive style underlie ideological differences in judgments of sexual orientation. Specifically, liberals were less likely than conservatives to endorse stereotypes about gender inversion and sexual orientation, and this difference in stereotype endorsement was partially explained by liberals' greater need for cognition. Implications for the accuracy of ambiguous category judgments made with the use of stereotypical cues in naturalistic settings are discussed.

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Conservatism and art preferences.

Cited by 127 publications

References 10 publications

Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation

Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude formation

Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.

The politics of gaydar: Ideological differences in the use of gendered cues in categorizing sexual orientation.

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