Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals

Abstract

Consequentialism is thought to be in significant conflict with animal rights theory because it does not regard activities such as confinement, killing, and exploitation as in principle morally wrong. Proponents of the “Logic of the Larder” argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly pro-exploitation stance, permitting us to eat farmed animals with positive well-being to ensure future such animals exist. Proponents of the “Logic of the Logger” argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly anti-conservationist stance, permitting us to exterminate wild animals with negative well-being to ensure future such animals do not exist. We argue that this conflict is overstated. Once we have properly accounted for indirect effects, such as the role that our policies play in shaping moral attitudes and behavior and the importance of accepting policies that are robust against deviation, we can see that consequentialism may converge with animal rights theory significantly, even if not entirely.

Positive Wild Animal Welfare

“…Indeed, we might even think that conservation efforts are detrimental to animal welfare, insofar as they increase the number of suffering animals. The idea that the net-negative welfare of wild animals could entail that their removal would be an improvement has been called the 'logic of the logger' (John and Sebo 2020). As well as changing the expected value of actions like these, it will also influence how strong a priority we place on wild animal welfare in comparison to other areas of animal welfare concern -such as whether this is a more urgent matter than factory farming.…”

Valuing humane lives in two-level utilitarianism

“…The replaceability argument has generated much debate (Delon 2016; Višak and Garner 2016). Not all consequentialists or utilitarians accept it (John and Sebo, forthcoming; Višak 2016). It makes controversial assumptions about the comparative value of existence relative to non-existence, the possibility of assigning zero welfare to non-existence, as well as the significance of the harm of death to animals that lack a sense of their future.…”

“…After all, the very reason we need intuitive rules is that the more complexity we introduce in our decision procedures, the less likely we are to deploy those rules reliably. The finer-grained the rule, the more room for error, complacency or rationalization (also see John and Sebo, forthcoming). Indeed, Rothgerber (2015) found evidence that conscientious omnivores are less likely than vegetarians to believe they should strictly adhere to their diet, and partly as a result are more likely to violate their diet and feel less guilt when doing so.…”

“… 9 For instance, Gruen and Jones (2015) argue for “veganism as an aspiration,” expressing both the inevitability of causing harm in our daily lives and the ethical commitment to regard sentient animals as non-edible. It was brought to my attention while revising this article that John and Sebo (forthcoming) argue from an indirect consequentialism perspective against the Logic of the Larder.…”

Neuroethics and Animals: Report and Recommendations From the University of Pennsylvania Animal Research Neuroethics Workshop

“…Moreover, one might worry that using animals this carelessly could lead to a general disregard for the welfare of animals, and so might lead indirectly to additional welfare concerns. 50 …”