Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents

McLennan, Andrew

doi:10.2307/2585673

Cited by 213 publications

(123 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Fortunately, our setting proposes a mechanism that results in the use of the 'first best' voting rule and is therefore immune to strategic non-informative voting. Such strategy-proofness does not hold under 'second best' anonymous aggregation rules, as have been demonstrated by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007), Feddersen andPesendorfer (1998) andMcLennan (1998). In fact, in this setting, effective deliberation prior to the vote is expected to take place, as established in Coughlan (2000).…”

Section: T P a T P A T P T P A T P T P A T P A Tmentioning

confidence: 89%

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

et al. 2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: D700.

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Section: T P a T P A T P T P A T P T P A T P A Tmentioning

confidence: 89%

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

et al. 2011

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“…This property is quite robust. For example, McLennan (1998) considers sequences of games with increasing n in which players have common preferences; full information equivalence again holds in the limit under very general conditions. Lohmann (1993) identifies conditions under which the same property holds when players demonstrate rather than vote.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games

2008

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ABSTRACT. This paper studies a class of information aggregation models which we call "aggregation games." It departs from the related literature in two main respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than making a binary choice. Each member of a group receives a private signal, then submits a report to the center, who makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The essence of an aggregation game is that heterogeneous players engage in a "tug-of-war," as they attempt to manipulate the center's decision process by mis-reporting their private information. When players have distinct biases, almost of them rationally exaggerate the extent of these biases. The degree of exaggeration increases with the number of players: if the game is sufficiently large, then almost all players exaggerate to the maximum admissible extent, regardless of their individual signals. In the limit, the connection between players' private information and the outcome of the game is obliterated.

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“…This paper shows that with unequal competences, one direction in this characterization holds for 2 Assuming commonality of preferences avoids confounding this kind of strategic voting with the kind that may result from the misalignment of different individuals' objectives. Strategic voting in the context of non-common preferences is studied, for example, in [12], [14], [15], [16], [17], [22], [23], [24], [26], [30] and [35]. For extensive strategic analysis of voting in committees, see [29].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

First and second best voting rules in committees

Ben-Yashar

Milchtaich

2007

Soc Choice Welfare

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Abstract.A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters' identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote noninformatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.* We are grateful to Jacob Paroush, Shmuel Nitzan, Steven Brams, Michele Piccione and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.

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Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents

Cited by 213 publications

References 18 publications

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records

Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games

First and second best voting rules in committees

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