Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?

Atkins, Burton M.; Green, Justin J.

doi:10.2307/2110569

Cited by 47 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Both these factors suggest that dissent is likely to be lower in courts with high caseloads (Brace & Hall 1990). Several studies using U.S. data have found that workload demands reduce the level of dissent (see, e.g., Atkins & Greene 1976; Wold & Caldeira 1980).…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Dissent on the High Court of Australia? An Empirical Assessment Using a Cointegration and Error Correction Approach

Narayan

Smyth

2007

J Empirical Legal Studies

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This article examines the factors influencing the annual dissent rate on the High Court of Australia from its first full year of operation in 1904 up to 2001 within a cointegration and error correction framework. We hypothesize that institutional factors, socioeconomic complexity, and leadership style explain variations in the dissent rate on the High Court of Australia over time. The institutional factors that we consider are the Court's caseload, whether it had discretion to select the cases it hears, and whether it was a final court of appeal. To measure socioeconomic complexity we use the divorce rate, urbanization rate, and real GDP per capita. Our main finding is that in the long run and short run, caseload and real income are the main factors influencing dissent. We find that a 1 percent increase in caseload and real income reduce the dissent rate on the High Court of Australia by 0.3 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively, holding other factors constant.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Dissent on the High Court of Australia? An Empirical Assessment Using a Cointegration and Error Correction Approach

Narayan

Smyth

2007

J Empirical Legal Studies

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“…Studies of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have also directed significant attention to nonunanimous decisions by circuit judges, especially when constructing models of judicial voting behavior. Often scholars have examined voting behavior in nonunanimous cases only, based on the logic that such decisions offer "choice situations sufficient to alter the outcomes while other cases do not" (Goldman, 1969, p. 217; see Atkins & Green, 1976). In cases where judges openly defy the majority's preferences by publishing a separate opinion, ideological differences are most clearly identified and the weaknesses of legal doctrine most pronounced.…”

Section: Theoretical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Separate Opinion Writing On The United States Courts Of Appeals

Hettinger¹,

Lindquist²,

Martinek

2003

American Politics Research

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In this article, we set ourselves to the task of identifying the determinants of separate opinion writing on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Utilizing a new institutional theoretical framework, we evaluate a series of hypotheses concerning the connection between separate opinion writing behavior and attitudinal, institutional, and legal factors. Within this broad theoretical framework, we are particularly sensitive to the manner in which judges may advance certain goals through authorship of separate opinions. We find that judges' policy preferences, case salience, and collegiality norms all affect the likelihood that a judge will write a separate opinion. Our research provides additional support for integrated models of judicial decision-making that take into account institutional, attitudinal, and legal influences on judicial behavior.

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“…Numerous studies report that the presence of an intermediate appellate court results in significantly higher levels of dissent (Canon and Jaros 1970;Beiser 1974;Handberg 1978;Glick and Pruet 1986), that heavy workload demands reduce the expression of dissent (Wold and Caldeira 1980; Atkins and Green 1976), and that a discretionary docket facilitates the expression of dissent (Hall 1985;Glick and Pruet 1986). From a neo-institutional perspective, large, nondiscretionary caseloads which remove control over the agenda process seemingly inhibit the opportunities for competition, and, as a result, inclusive rather than exclusive coalitions form.…”

Section: Decision Rules and Institutional Arrangementsmentioning

confidence: 99%