Consciousness: A Computational Paradigm Update

Abstract

This dualist model of mind-body addresses the formal and physical limits to computation that critics of artificial intelligence argue are the reason computers will never produce really intelligent machines. This model describes potential ideal computational leverage mechanisms that are based upon primitive properties of the universe (such as space, time, and number of dimensions) derived from modern physics consistency arguments. An intuitive model of computational costs is introduced to create a framework for discussing how unlimited computation could be derived from space, time, and observer requirements. This cost model suggests that an ideal solution for unlimited intelligence would require a sparse, high dimensional spacetime (unrestricted locality) and a formalized observer mechanism (mobile observer framework based on a superset of inertial frame properties). This solution simultaneously addresses the semantical issue of unrestricted locality by maintaining a space/time metric but by going beyond the non-locality constraints of 4D physical implementation layers. Such a computational model would strongly support a dualist model of the consciousness, where the mind has properties distinct from the brain/body. This solution would differentiate why naturally occurring "real intelligence" computation systems exhibit consciousness and why current artificial intelligence solutions are not really intelligent nor do they exhibit consciousness. This original paper and model are still valid today and this paper includes updates due to new results developed since the original model.

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 2 (An anthology of various other models)

“…It is suggested that qualia, raw sensory and emotional subjective feelings arise secondary to having evolved into a higher order of thought system, and that sensory and emotional processing feels like something because it would be unparsimonious for it to enter the planning and higher order thought system and not feel like something (Matzke, 2010[160]). Raw sensory feels and subjective states associated with emotional and motivational states, may not necessarily arise first in evolution (Rolls, 2007[196]).…”