Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. I will argue that this challenge collapses once the underlying conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. I will argue, in other words, that the empirical evidence does not support a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In the final section, I will suggest that empirical research on human agency is nevertheless relevant to various questions about moral responsibility.

The (in)Significance of the Addiction Debate

“…As the words 'choice' and 'uncontrollable' may both suggest the existence or lack of alternative possibilities, by focussing on impulsivity, we circumvent this metaphysical question and discuss the effects of addiction on capacity on a practical and empirical level. After all, the specifics of addiction (and the debate) would not be relevant to be discussed on an overarching, metaphysical level as the challenge is the same for all behaviour, not just addiction (see also [40,45]). theorists claim that addicts are able to do as they wish.…”

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

“…Relatedly, Gallagher (2006) notes that we may be expected to directly cognise features of our situation and environment, while subpersonal processes remain largely inaccessible at that level of cognition, despite being broadly directed by processes at that level. Others have noted that our proximal intentions, even if formed fairly automatically, may be directed by distal intentions that are typically available to conscious awareness (Nahmias 2010;Schlosser 2013).…”

“…It's often supposed that our decisions would need to be responsive to reasons in order for us to count as morally responsible (Wolf 1990;Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Schlosser (2013) and Levy (2011Levy ( , 2013Levy ( , 2014a have argued that there is a crucial link between conscious awareness and the ability to respond to reasons. They both suppose that it is (broadly) access consciousness that is required for this ability, as opposed to phenomenal consciousness.…”

Enhancing responsibility: Directions for an interdisciplinary investigation

“…But the claim that human beings are responsive to reasons as required is itself amenable to scientific scrutiny. For example, some other philosophers have examined whether the situationist literature-empirical results showing that minor aspects of the environment can influence our behavior in usually unnoticed ways-undermines reasons responsiveness (see, e.g., Nelkin, 2005;Schlosser, 2013;Shepherd, 2015). This is another instance of the Minimal model at work.…”