Conscious Action/Zombie Action

Abstract

I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is (at the very least) a temporally extended, co‐conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do.

Through the forest of motor representations

“…Since the literature contains a vast amount of evidence I can avoid this point (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014: 123, 124;Nanay, 2014: 4;Pacherie, 2002Pacherie, : 61, 2006Pacherie, :14, 2008Pacherie, : 189, 90, 20102011: 14 and sec. 4; for a more general discussion about action control see Shepherd, 2014Shepherd, , 2015aShepherd, , 2015bWong, 2009Wong, , 2010Wong, , 2015. I am primarily interested in the MR functions necessary to transform the sensory input into motor output in order to explain the mental antecedents of actions.…”

The two-visual-systems hypothesis and the perspectival features of visual experience

“…2010; Kozuch, n.d.;Mole, 2009;Shepherd, 2015;Wallhagen, 2007;Wu, 2013). But there is another equally contentious issue about whether or not Goodale and Milner's conception of the TVSH can accommodate the fundamentally egocentric nature of visual experience (what we call the 'perspectival account').…”

Conscious Control over Action

“…In my view, such a possibility is the tip of an iceberg. In other work I have emphasised the possible importance of non‐visual aspects of consciousness for overt action control, such as conscious trying (Shepherd, ). There is not space to rehash that discussion here.…”