Connotation and Frege’s Semantic Dualism

Abstract

The traditional distinction between Millian and Fregean theories of names presupposes that what Mill calls ‘connotation’ lines up with what Frege calls ‘sense.’ This presupposition is false. Mill’s talk of connotation is an attempt to bring into view the line of thought that crystallizes in Frege’s distinction between concept and object. This latter is the semantic dualism of my title.

Revisiting Semantic Issues of Proper Names

“…By Mill's account, PNs have no connotation. This would mean, however, that there is not anything for the mind to grasp (Hicks 2019). What contribution, then, can a PN make to the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs?…”

“…However, Fregeans are unable to account for rigid designation of names; nor are they able to explain the fact that names never change referents via a change in the circumstance of evaluation. That is, they refer to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists (see also Hicks 2019;Haddock 2006;Coates 2000;Evans 1982;McDowell 1977). 3 Frege's theory was adopted and developed by many theorists and linguists (e.g., Nelson 1992;Algeo 1973;Russell 1919Russell /1971Searle 1969Searle /1971 of whom Bertrand Russell and John Roger Searle are commonly accepted as two of the greatest contributors.…”