“…This theoretical framing is possible now that the role of affect in moral reasoning is better understood and a prominent focus of research is on moral psychology ( Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001 ; Haidt, 2001 ; Krebs & Denton, 2005 ; Vecina, Marzana, & Paruzel-Czachura, 2015 ). Current research, in fact, has moved away from considering moral judgment as an essentially rational process ( Kohlberg, 1984 ) to increasingly emphasizing the role of affect and intuition in arriving at moral judgments ( Kunda, 1990 ; Merritt et al, 2012 ; Monin & Jordan, 2009 ; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009 ).…”