Conjuring Ethics from Words

McKeown-Green, Jonathan; Pettigrove, Glen; Webster, Aness Kim

doi:10.1111/nous.12004

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Clarifying the Idea Of Epistemic Modesty In Ethics1

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“…All the explanation says is that there is excellent inductive evidence for the claim that there is a limit on the capacity of creatures like us in a world like ours 19 See Gibbard (2014) for doubts about such an assumption. 20 See McKeown-Green et al (2015).…”

Section: Clarifying the Idea Of Epistemic Modesty In Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic modesty in ethics

Laskowski

2017

Philos Stud

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Many prominent ethicists, including Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis concerning our capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing. But it is a thesis that has received surprisingly little explicit and focused attention, despite its widespread acceptance. After explaining why the thesis is true, I argue that it has several implications in metaethics, including, especially, implications that should lead us to rethink our understanding of Reductive Realism. In particular, the thesis of epistemic modesty in ethics implies a kind of epistemic modesty about the metaphysical nature of ethics, if Reductive Realism about the metaphysical nature of ethics is true, and it implies that normative concepts are indispensable to practical deliberation in a way that answers an influential objection to Reductive Realism from

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Section: Clarifying the Idea Of Epistemic Modesty In Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%