Congressional Response to Mandate Elections

Abstract

Elections from time to time are widely believed to carry a mandate, to express a message about changed policy preferences of the electorate. Whatever the accuracy of such beliefs-a matter about which we are skeptical-perceptions of a mandate should affect the behavior of actors in government. Politicians lack the scholarly luxury of waiting for careful analyses. They must act in the months following elections. We postulate that many will act as if the mandate perceptions were true, veering away from their normal voting patterns. This is driven by election results and interpretations that undermine old calculations about what voters want. As the flow of information gradually changes these perceptions, and the election becomes more distant, members of Congress return to their normal position. We first ask, how would members observe an emerging consensus of mandate? And then we model the duration of the change in behavior in an event-history framework. That permits a depiction of important movements of the median member and, from this, inferences about policy impact.

George W. Bush’s Domestic Policy Agenda

“…The cycle of decreasing influence suggests that presidents are most likely to succeed in Congress with their first-year policy agenda. It is during a president's first-year honeymoon, after all, that an electoral mandate-if present-is most likely to affect legislators' support for the president (Peterson, Grossback, Stimson, and Gangl 2003) and when presidents typically have the public's support. As time proceeds, capital is spent, and failures mount, presidential influence in Congress should decrease.…”

Redistricting Reform Could Save California from Itself

“…However, that does not prevent legislators from behaving as if they believe in mandates. Indeed, anecdotal evidence (Congress passing Reagan's budget in 1981 and Bush's tax cuts in 2001) and more systematic evidence (Peterson et al 2003) support the claim that Congress reacts to large changes.…”

Policy-Motivated Parties in Dynamic Political Competition

“…Dahl (1990) points out that both of these arguments are selfserving and notes that even if the margin of victory is large it is unclear whether overwhelming support for the winner translates into support for a particular policy. However, recent empirical evidence indicates that mandates do have an effect on policies and candidates (Conley, 2001;Fowler, 2005Fowler, , 2006Peterson et al, 2003).…”