Congressional oversight and electoral accountability

Abstract

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

Keeping tabs on the executive

“…In addition to being a symbol of a functioning separation of powers system, oversight also can be a signal sent to other government officials and to the public. Because information acquisition is costly, the most common way that legislators reveal their underlying willingness to pay for policy change is by challenging or defending executive action through oversight (Bussing & Pomirchy, 2022; Ethridge, 1984; Feldman & March, 1981; Hall & Miler, 2008). In addition to taking highly observable oversight actions like holding hearings, members of Congress can send such signals through nonhearing techniques like requesting the GAO to conduct program evaluation or having committee staff review an agency program.…”

“…Holding a hearing is a costly, strategic decision to frame the debate on an issue and to document legislative stances to key constituent groups (Beermann, 2006; Bussing & Pomirchy, 2022; Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000; Ogul & Rockman, 1990). Explained by a staff member for a House committee chair, “Hearings are basically for show, but they allow us to flex our muscles, and provide a record of our position” (Talbert et al, 1995, p. 388).…”