Congestion-Driven Transmission Expansion in Competitive Power Markets

Shrestha, G.B.; Fonseka, P.A.J.

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2004.831701

Cited by 185 publications

(86 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Since the focus of this paper is on the coordination of transmission and generation planning, and for the sake of simplicity, only scenarios formed by the different demand levels on the evolution of the system in the future is being considered. Also, a simplified model of the transmission and generation expansion is introduced in which the investment decisions are modeled as extra capacities for the lines and for the generating units, [4], [34], [40]. We assume that an increase in the capacity of a line does not change the topology of the network.…”

Section: A Efficient Planning Of Generation and Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Generation and Transmission Development Through Generation Transmission Charges—A Game Theoretical Approach

Tohidi

Olmos

Rivier

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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Section: A Efficient Planning Of Generation and Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Generation and Transmission Development Through Generation Transmission Charges—A Game Theoretical Approach

Tohidi

Olmos

Rivier

et al. 2017

IEEE Trans. Power Syst.

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“…Various economic indices are adopted such as producer surplus, consumer surplus, congestion surplus and welfare from the optimization [7,8,9,10]. The technical and economic assessment of different investment alternatives for the electricity transmission infrastructure reveals so-called 'asymmetric' impacts towards different stakeholders in importing and exporting zones in the future European electricity system when large scale of renewable energy will be integrated into the system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric impacts of European transmission network development towards 2050: Stakeholder assessment based on IRENE-40 scenarios

et al. 2016

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This paper presents the assessment of stakeholder impacts of European electricity transmission network investments for a set of future system development scenarios. A techno-economic analysis is adopted, which quantifies the economic impacts on different stakeholders including electricity producers, consumers, and network investors, under the future de-carbonisation pathways described in the IRENE-40 scenarios, ranging from 2010 to 2050. To quantify the impact of transmission infrastructure development, for each pathway, two distinct scenarios of future European transmission development are assessed: "low" (no new transmission between 2010 and 2050) and "high" (optimal transmission development between 2010 and 2050 to accommodate the generation pathway).The geographical scope of the analysis covers the EU 27+2 nations. A detailed case study of Spain and France is presented to illustrate so-called 'asymmetric' impacts towards different stakeholders in different importing and exporting zones. The resulting arbitrage trades shift the market equilibriums, which eventually affect asymmetrically the welfare of stakeholders.

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“…The transmission planner minimises the investment costs subject to a set of technical constraints. In the liberalised electricity markets, the optimisation problem is modified by adding the social welfare to the objective function of the transmission planning problem, [1][2][3][4][5]. Each transmission system operator maximises the social welfare of his electricity network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-national transmission planning using joint and disjoint solutions

Tohidi

Hesamzadeh

2013

2013 10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)

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Abstract-Transmission systems have a critical role in wellfunctioning of liberalised electricity markets. Diversity in generation portfolio and improving system reliability are the main incentives for significant cross-border trades between Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in Europe. Nowadays, two ways are discussed for investment in additional transmission capacity by multiple TSOs: (1) Cooperative approach and (2) non-cooperative approache. In cooperative planning, the governing body looks for the highest overall social welfare while in non-cooperative approach, each TSO decides on his own transmission system based on his social welfare. The problem is that the outcome of these two approaches might be different. Each TSO tries to maximise his own social welfare and they are reluctant to act in a joint solution where they are losing some of their social welfare. In the context, they prefer to act strategically in order to maximise their social welfare. This paper evaluates the joint and disjoint solutions of the multi-national transmission planning. We propose a simultaneous-move game between the involved TSOs. The game is formulated as a one-shot mixedinteger linear programming problem. Then the joint solution is developed by merging all TSOs in one TSO responsible for transmission planning in all TSOs' regions. The joint solution is formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming and used as the benchmark in our studies.

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Congestion-Driven Transmission Expansion in Competitive Power Markets

Cited by 185 publications

References 12 publications

Coordination of Generation and Transmission Development Through Generation Transmission Charges—A Game Theoretical Approach

Coordination of Generation and Transmission Development Through Generation Transmission Charges—A Game Theoretical Approach

Asymmetric impacts of European transmission network development towards 2050: Stakeholder assessment based on IRENE-40 scenarios

Multi-national transmission planning using joint and disjoint solutions

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