Confronting the risks of terrorism: making the right decisions

Garrick, B. John; Hall, James E.; Kilger, Max; McDonald, John C.; O’Toole, Tara; Probst, Peter; Parker, Elizabeth Rindskopf; Rosenthal, Robert; Trivelpiece, A. W.; Arsdale, Lee A. Van; Zebroski, E.L.

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2004.04.003

Cited by 172 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…For large, national infrastructures, these methods need to be adapted to the infrastructure's technological and sociopolitical complexities [18]. Garrick et al [19] outline a possible application of PRA techniques in the analysis of infrastructures.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bulk power risk analysis: Ranking infrastructure elements according to their risk significance

Koonce

Apostolakis

Cook

2008

International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bulk power risk analysis: Ranking infrastructure elements according to their risk significance

Koonce

Apostolakis

Cook

2008

International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems

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“…Paté-Cornell and Guikema (30) are among the first to apply the techniques of PRA to terrorism risk. Many papers follow, (31)(32)(33)(34)(35) often using simplified models that rely on the definition "Risk = Threat (T) × Vulnerability (V) × Consequence (C)," where subject matter experts assess the threat and vulnerability terms as probabilities, and the consequence term in units of, for example, economic replacement cost, or fatalities. (36,37) When applied to critical infrastructure, the notion is to assess adversary intent as "threat" (38) ) and then rely on such assessments for proposed methods to optimize defense.…”

Section: Nondeliberate Hazards Versus Deliberate Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operational Models of Infrastructure Resilience

2015

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We propose a definition of infrastructure resilience that is tied to the operation (or function) of an infrastructure as a system of interacting components and that can be objectively evaluated using quantitative models. Specifically, for any particular system, we use quantitative models of system operation to represent the decisions of an infrastructure operator who guides the behavior of the system as a whole, even in the presence of disruptions. Modeling infrastructure operation in this way makes it possible to systematically evaluate the consequences associated with the loss of infrastructure components, and leads to a precise notion of "operational resilience" that facilitates model verification, validation, and reproducible results. Using a simple example of a notional infrastructure, we demonstrate how to use these models for (1) assessing the operational resilience of an infrastructure system, (2) identifying critical vulnerabilities that threaten its continued function, and (3) advising policymakers on investments to improve resilience.

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“…According to what some existent models have shown [23], cyber attacks may be more difficult to perform successfully than physical attacks. However, cyber attacks can be accessorial to enlarge the damage of physical attacks.…”

Section: Attacking Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability of interconnected power systems to malicious attacks under limited information

Bompard

Napoli

Xue

2008

Int Trans Elec Energy Syst

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SUMMARYMalicious attacks against critical infrastructures, and power systems as well, became a key-concern in recent years. The attacks may be both ''physical,'' directed towards system components, and ''cyber,'' against the information/communication system; simultaneous attacks to different components, both physical and cyber, may be possible. In this context, the assessment of the vulnerability of a given interconnected power system, in terms of the possibility to keep it feasible after a defined attack, w.r.t a limited number of information available (both due to attacks or a regulatory rule) is of the utmost importance. In this paper, we propose a game model, based on the socially rational multi-agent system (MAS) and fictitious play, which can be used to assess the sensitivity of the system structure and operational state to various availabilities of network information. From the model both a ranking of the critical information and a strategy of network reinforcement to decrease system vulnerability can be derived. The proposed model and methods are applied to a 34-buses test system for illustrative purposes.

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Confronting the risks of terrorism: making the right decisions

Cited by 172 publications

References 13 publications

Bulk power risk analysis: Ranking infrastructure elements according to their risk significance

Bulk power risk analysis: Ranking infrastructure elements according to their risk significance

Operational Models of Infrastructure Resilience

Vulnerability of interconnected power systems to malicious attacks under limited information

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