Confronting relativism

Irvine, William B.

doi:10.1007/s12129-000-1022-z

Cited by 6 publications

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“…One might wonder why we shouldn't therefore be tolerant of all judgements, including judgements of truth. Indeed, naïve skeptics often make this point; extending one's commitment to tolerance is thus a common feature among such skeptics (Delaney 2004;Erion 2005;Irvine 2000;Lewis 2015;Momeyer 1995).…”

Section: Naïve Skepticism and Student Ethical Commitmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…engage in successful, if basic, disciplinary practice are core focuses of many introductory courses. 3 These twin goals often come apart for a variety of reasons, including the structural limits imposed on typical university-level courses, preexisting student commitments (Boud and Walker 1990;Delaney 2004;Erion 2005;Irvine 2000;Lewis 2015;Momeyer 1995) and beliefs (Booth 2006;Erion 2005;J. Meyer, Land, and Rust 2003;Momeyer 1995;Satris 1986), pedagogical strategies employed to realize certain aims (Besong 2016;Land et al 2005), and students' states of intellectual development (Ambrose et al 2010;Beebe and Sackris 2016;Finster 1989;Lochrie 1989;Perry 1970).…”

Section: : Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The truth, but not yet: avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims

Wright

2019

Teaching in Higher Education

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Introductory students regularly endorse naïve skepticismunsupported or uncritical doubt about the existence and universality of truth-for a variety of reasons. Though some of the reasons for students' skepticism can be traced back to the student-for example, a desire to avoid engaging with controversial material or a desire to avoid offense-naïve skepticism is also the result of how introductory courses are taught, deemphasizing truth to promote students' abilities to develop basic disciplinary skills. While this strategy has a number of pedagogical benefits, it prevents students in early stages of intellectual development from understanding truth as a threshold concept. I argue that we can make progress against naïve skepticism by clearly discussing how metadisciplinary aims differ at the disciplinary and course levels in a way that is meaningful, reinforced, and accessible.

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Section: Naïve Skepticism and Student Ethical Commitmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: : Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The truth, but not yet: avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims

Wright

2019

Teaching in Higher Education

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'Many People Are Saying…': Applying the Lessons of Naïve Skepticism to the Fight against Fake News and Other 'Total Bullshit'

Wright

2019

Postdigit Sci Educ

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Fake news' has become an increasingly common refrain in public discourse. The term itself has several uses, at least one of which constitutes Frankfurtian bullshit. After examining what sorts of fake news appeals do and do not count as bullshit, I discuss strategies for overcoming our openness to such bullshit. I do so by drawing a parallel between openness to bullshit and naïve skepticism-one's willingness to reject the concept of truth on unsupported or ill-considered grounds-and suggest that this parallel indicates three principles for how we ought to combat our openness to fake news and other bullshit. First, the root causes of bullshit openness are not monolithic; we should adopt anti-bullshit strategies in recognition of this fact. Second, our efforts to overcome bullshit openness should be collaborative efforts to create an environment that allows for sustained interrogation of our bullshit openness, rather than a confrontational provision of contrary evidence, despite the fact that such strategies are more time-intensive. Third, social media is unlikely to be a fertile ground on which we will make meaningful progress in the fight against bullshit because of the inherent nature of social media platforms as spaces for short, declarative, confrontational claims.

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Universalism Versus Relativism in Public Relations

Kim¹

2005

Journal of Mass Media Ethics

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Confronting relativism

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The truth, but not yet: avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims

The truth, but not yet: avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims

'Many People Are Saying…': Applying the Lessons of Naïve Skepticism to the Fight against Fake News and Other 'Total Bullshit'

Universalism Versus Relativism in Public Relations

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