Conformance Checking of RBAC Policy and its Implementation

Hansen, F.; Oleshchuk, Vladimir

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31979-5_13

Cited by 26 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Hansen et al [13] utilize model checker SPIN to verify various static and dynamic separation of duty properties in RBAC. Their approach does not support any form of delegation, and the authors do not provide a theoretical performance bound.…”

Section: Other Access Control Verification Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal verification of security properties in trust management policy

Niu

Reith

Winsborough

2014

JCS

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Trust management is a scalable form of access control that relies heavily on delegation. Different parts of the policy are under the control of different principals in the system. While these two characteristics may be necessary in large or decentralized systems, they make it difficult to anticipate how policy changes made by others will affect whether ones own security objectives are met and will continue to be met in the future. Automated analysis tools are needed for assessing this question. The article develops techniques that support the development of tools that nevertheless are able to solve many analysis problem instances. When an access control policy fails to satisfy desired security objectives, the tools provide information about how and why the failure occurs. Such information can assist policy authors design appropriate policies. The approach to performing the analyses is based on model checking. To assist in making the approach effective, a collection of reduction techniques is introduced. We prove the correctness of these reductions and empirically evaluate their effectiveness. While the class of analysis problem instances we examine is generally intractable, we find that our reduction techniques are often able to reduce some problem instances into a form that can be automatically verified.

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Section: Other Access Control Verification Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal verification of security properties in trust management policy

Niu

Reith

Winsborough

2014

JCS

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“…In [9], Hansen and Oleshchuk introduce an approach to check the implementation of RBAC constraints using the Spin 4 model checker. They formally express the given RBAC properties via LTL.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conformance Checking of RBAC Policies in Process-Aware Information Systems

Baumgrass

Baier

Mendling

et al. 2012

Business Process Management Workshops

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Abstract. A process-aware information system (PAIS) is a software system that supports the definition, execution, and analysis of business processes. The execution of process instances is typically recorded in so called event logs. In this paper, we present an approach to automatically generate LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) statements from process-related RBAC (Role-based Access Control) models. These LTL statements are used to check if process executions that are recorded via event logs conform to the access control policies defined via a corresponding RBAC model. To demonstrate our approach, we implemented a RBAC-to-LTL component, and used the ProM tool to test the resulting LTL statements with event logs created from process simulations in CPN tools.

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“…Schaad et al [17] verified separation of duty properties in RBAC systems using NuSMV. Hansen et al [8] utilized SPIN to verify various static and dynamic separation of duty properties in RBAC. Other work [6,7,9,19] also supports the use of formal tools to verify properties of security policies.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Refinement-based design of a group-centric secure information sharing model

Zhao

Niu

Winsborough

2012

Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

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This paper presents a formal, state machine-based specification (stateful specification) of a high assurance, secure information-sharing policy. The policy is group-centric; users join and leave groups, objects are added and removed (group operations). Users gain access to objects via membership relationships they have or have had with groups that contain or have contained those objects. The stateful specification given here is a refinement of a prior specification that is given in first-order linear temporal logic (FOTL). The prior FOTL specification defines authorization based solely on event histories, but gives little guidance regarding implementation. The current specification is the result of a second step in a multi-step design process that separates concerns and provides multiple opportunities to detect unintended policy characteristics. We show that our stateful specification is consistent with the prior FOTL specification with respect to the action sequences it permits and the authorization decisions it renders. For verification purposes we use a combination of model-checking and manual techniques.

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Conformance Checking of RBAC Policy and its Implementation

Cited by 26 publications

References 9 publications

Formal verification of security properties in trust management policy

Formal verification of security properties in trust management policy

Conformance Checking of RBAC Policies in Process-Aware Information Systems

Refinement-based design of a group-centric secure information sharing model

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