Conflicting objectives in groundwater management

Péreau, Jean-Christophe

doi:10.1016/j.wre.2018.06.001

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The simulation of the groundwater aquifer is carried out according to Gisser and Mercado (1973), Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Pereau and Pryet (2018) and Pereau (2020). The aim is to derive an equation describing the gradual decline of the groundwater table level.…”

Section: Aquifer Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Natural discharge is related to the flow of groundwater either towards the sea in coastal areas, in which case it is directly linked to the loss of freshwater that could be used for human activities, or towards rivers-streams (Pereau and Pryet, 2018). In any case, the consideration of natural discharge, which has been modelled within a "bathtub" model by Pereau and Pryet (2018) and Pereau (2020), is expected to have a significant impact on the results obtained when formulating groundwater management policies. Natural discharge is expected to have an impact on the outcomes of a groundwater management policy, since its consideration firstly increases the scarcity of groundwater and secondly leads to a faster decline of the aquifer's groundwater table level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Aquifer Management Establishing a Tradable Water Rights System: The Effect of Natural Discharge and Salinity

Tsiarapas,

Mallios

2023

EREM

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Economic instruments such as tradable water rights systems have been proposed as cost-effective methods for managing groundwater. The relevant literature shows that the majority of the relevant studies do not consider aquifer’s natural discharge, which is expected to have a significant impact on the determination of the optimal groundwater management policy. This paper attempts to highlight the impact of considering natural discharge in the formulation of groundwater management policies. Thus, two different cases of aquifer management are considered and the corresponding time-dynamic problems are solved by considering natural discharge in order to derive optimal trajectories for a number of key variables. These cases are (1) non-intervention – full competition and (2) intervention with a tradable water rights system. The results obtained from simulations on a coastal aquifer show that indeed not considering the natural discharge leads to an overestimation of the benefits from groundwater consumption that can reach 5.79% in the case of non-intervention and in the case of intervention with a tradable water rights system.

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Section: Aquifer Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aquifer Management Establishing a Tradable Water Rights System: The Effect of Natural Discharge and Salinity

Tsiarapas,

Mallios

2023

EREM

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“…More recently, a large number of papers have addressed the problem of how a public agency allocates water from one or more underground aquifers to different types of users (e.g. farmers and municipalities) to ensure collective welfare for users and sufficient drainage to preserve the ecosystem (Pereau et al, 2019;Pereau, 2020;Augeraud-Veron & Pereau, 2022). The authors analyze both viable solutions and the social optimum in a discrete and continuous dynamic model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal water tariffs for domestic, agricultural and industrial use

Caravaggio,

De Cesare,

Di Liddo

2024

Ann Oper Res

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Consider a water supplier who determines sales rates with the goals of maximizing profits, protecting consumer welfare, and ensuring adequate future water supplies. Buyers are differentiated and can use the water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes. We propose a leader-follower finite-horizon differential game. The leader (the water supplier) determines the selling price and the followers (consumers) react by requesting their optimal amount of water. We calculate a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium assuming that all user demand is satisfied (interior equilibrium). We compare two different tariff schemes: linear tariffs (the price paid is a multiple of the volume of water purchased), and increasing block tariffs (the unit price is lower for quantities of water that do not exceed a fixed threshold). We show that block pricing is never optimal and linear pricing is always preferred.

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“…By reconsidering the results of [2], several papers have recently addressed the problem of how a public agency allocates water from (one or more) aquifers to different users (e.g., farmers and municipalities), in order to ensure the collective welfare of users and sufficient drainage to preserve the ecosystem, as discussed in [8][9][10]. Similarly, [11] developed a differential game to determine the efficient extraction of the aquifer resource in overlapping generations framework (OLG) modeling.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Differential Game for Optimal Water Price Management

Caravaggio

Cesare

Liddo

2023

Games

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This article studies a leader–follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the interior solution is considered), and the following different tariff schemes are analyzed: linear scheme, increasing block tariff, and convex tariff. Numerical simulations highlight how tariff convexity and seasonality in buyer’s preferences affect water price and demand, and the dynamics of the basin over time. The study shows that synchrony or asynchrony between basin recharge and buyer cyclical demand can dramatically affect the dynamics and basin levels observed at the end of the time period considered. Additionally, the presence of a large number of fluctuations in buyer preferences affects basin fluctuations, while natural recharge may help in maintaining acceptable levels of future water demands.

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Conflicting objectives in groundwater management

Cited by 8 publications

References 36 publications

Aquifer Management Establishing a Tradable Water Rights System: The Effect of Natural Discharge and Salinity

Aquifer Management Establishing a Tradable Water Rights System: The Effect of Natural Discharge and Salinity

Optimal water tariffs for domestic, agricultural and industrial use

A Differential Game for Optimal Water Price Management

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