Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore

doi:10.3386/w19221

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…In particular, our emphasis on the importance of external threats is related to the insights of Alesina and Spolaore (), who study the role of war in shaping political boundaries. It is also related to Levine and Modica (), who propose a theory of the emergence (or absence) of hegemonic rule . In examining the causes of political fragmentation and centralization in China and Europe, we build on earlier work that points to the role of geography, such as Diamond (), and on the work of many historians who stress how the threat of nomadic invasion from the steppe shaped Chinese history (Lattimore, ; Grousset, ; Huang, ; Barfield, ; Gat, ; Turchin, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…One insight of the model is that external threats lead to the consolidation of countries (Alesina and Spolaore, ). Using an evolutionary setting, Levine and Modica () argue that the presence of strong outsiders would instead weaken the tendency toward hegemony (i.e., empire). Our model suggests that external threats can indeed foster political centralization in some situations and political fragmentation in others depending on the threat nature (magnitude and direction).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Unified China and Divided Europe

Koyama

Sng

2018

Int Economic Review

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This paper studies the causes and consequences of political centralization and fragmentation in China and Europe. We argue that the severe and unidirectional threat of external invasion fostered political centralization in China while Europe faced a wider variety of moderate external threats and remained politically fragmented. Our model allows us to explore the economic consequences of political centralization and fragmentation. Political centralization in China led to lower taxation and hence faster population growth during peacetime than in Europe. But it also meant that China was relatively fragile in the event of an external invasion. Our results are consistent with historical evidence of violent conflicts, tax levels, and population growth in both China and Europe.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

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confidence: 99%

Unified China and Divided Europe

Koyama

Sng

2018

Int Economic Review

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“…The variation in tax revenues and government spending (particularly military expenditures) should, in turn, shed light on the rise and fall of states and their expansion and contraction. Heavy taxes (including conscripted military labor services) provoked revolts, but they also allowed a state to defend itself and defeat and swallow up military competitors (Levine and Modica 2013). In the eighteenth century, when Britain was only beginning to industrialize, it collected far more tax revenue per capita than China or France, and its taxes were a higher share of national income, too.…”

Section: Questions Raised By the Book Fiscal Regimes And The Politicamentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Economics and History: A Review of Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States, Edited by Andrew Monson and Walter Scheidel

Hoffman

2017

Journal of Economic Literature

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Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States greatly expands our knowledge of the history of premodern fiscal systems and raises important questions about the political economy of premodern states. Answering those questions can help explain how states developed the capacity to tax; why tax levels and government-spending patterns varied greatly in the past, even though per capita incomes were similar; how government debt and representative institutions arose; and, last but not least, why some premodern states expanded and others collapsed. But firm answers to those questions will have to combine the history outlined in Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States with systematic data and formal models of political economy. (JEL E62, H20, H50, N40)

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Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies

Levine

Modica

2013

Research in Economics

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The Malthusian theory of evolution disregards a pervasive fact about human societies:\ud they expand through conflict. When this is taken account of the long-run favors not a\ud large population at the level of subsistence, nor yet institutions that maximize welfare or\ud per capita output, but rather institutions that generate large amount of free resources and\ud direct these towards state power. Free resources are the output available to society after\ud deducting the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce\ud production, and the other claims to production such as transfer payments and resources\ud absorbed by elites. We develop the evolutionary underpinnings of this model, and\ud examine the implications for the evolution of societies in several applications. Since free\ud resources are increasing both in per capita income and population, evolution will favor\ud large rich societies. We will show how technological improvement can increase or\ud decrease per capita output as well as increasing population

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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Cited by 4 publications

References 27 publications

Unified China and Divided Europe

Unified China and Divided Europe

Public Economics and History: A Review of Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States, Edited by Andrew Monson and Walter Scheidel

Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies

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