Conflict, Cooperation, and Delegated Diplomacy

Abstract

Does diplomacy affect the prospects of international conflict and cooperation? Systematic empirical assessment has been hindered by the inferential challenges of separating diplomacy from the distribution of power and interests that underlies its conduct. This paper addresses the question of diplomacy's efficacy by examining the intragovernmental politics of US foreign policy, and the varying influence of diplomatic personnel in the policy process. I claim that diplomats hold the strongest preferences for cooperative relations with their host countries, relative to other participants in the foreign policy process. They also exert substantial influence over the formation and implementation of US policies toward their host countries but their influence is intermittently weakened by the short-term shock of an ambassadorial turnover. As a result, when ambassadors are removed from post, diplomacy is more likely to be eschewed for more conflictual means of settling international disagreements, and opportunities for economic exchange are less likely to be realized. I test this theory using newly collected data on US diplomatic representation, for the global sample of countries from 1960 through 2014. To address concerns of diplomatic staffing being endogenous to political interests, I leverage a natural experiment arising from the State Department's three-year ambassadorial rotation system. The turnover of a US ambassador causes a decrease in US exports to the country experiencing the turnover, and heightens the risk of onset of a militarized dispute between that country and the US. These findings point to bureaucratic delegation as an important but overlooked determinant of macro-level international outcomes.

Informing the Leader: Bureaucracies and International Crises

“…However, parochialism could be more rampant in internal communication that typically lacks leader oversight. Consistent with recent work (Lindsey 2017;Malis 2021), bureaucratic agents further removed from direct communication with the leader-such as diplomats stationed abroad-may exhibit more skewed policy preferences than I find.…”

Just Patronage? Familiarity and the Diplomatic Value of Non-Career Ambassadors

“…The powerful logic of cheap talk (see, e.g., Fearon 1994) spurred a torrent of important work aimed at explaining the apparent credibility of private or ‘costless’ diplomacy (e.g., Trager 2017; Ramsay 2011; Sartori 2002; Yarhi-Milo 2013; Holmes 2018). With increased confidence in the potential for diplomacy to influence international outcomes, scholars—particularly those working in a rationalist or political psychology tradition—have begun to explore diplomatic practice, including research on high-level diplomatic travel (Lebovic and Saunders 2016; Malis and Smith 2021; McManus 2018; Goldsmith et al 2021), the role of status and reputation (Duque 2018; Pouliot 2016; Goldfien et al 2023), and the appointment and performance of envoys and ambassadors (Lindsey 2017; MacDonald 2021; Towns and Niklasson 2017; Haglund 2015; Hollibaugh Jr 2015; Arias and Smith 2018; Fedderke and Jett 2017; Malis 2021). 4…”

“…For diplomatic channels to function, there has to be confidence that diplomatic representatives actually represent their principals. Prior work investigates the role of ambassadorial vacancies in influencing international outcomes (Malis 2021). This study suggests that who fills ambassadorial posts critically influences patterns of conflict and cooperation.…”

“…This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it theorizes representation in diplomacy, introducing familiarity as a key concept in the nascent literature on delegated bargaining in international affairs (e.g., Lindsey 2017; Malis 2021; MacDonald 2021). For diplomatic channels to function, there has to be confidence that diplomatic representatives actually represent their principals.…”