Conflict and Negotiation: Trends and Emerging Issues

Smith, William P.

doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1987.tb01175.x

Cited by 59 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 87 publications

(87 reference statements)

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“…At the same time, we extend this literature by examining the implicitness of a threat and by showing that the effect of the nature of the threat may be moderated by its timing. In this way, while most research on the effectiveness of threats examined factors exogenous to the interaction (for reviews, see Smith 1987;Tedeschi and Bonoma 1977), such as the perpetrator's and target's characteristics, the current study supports the idea that factors endogenous to the interaction also matter.…”

Section: How and When Threats Are Stated Matterssupporting

confidence: 76%

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Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

Sinaceur

Neale

2005

Group Decis Negot

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The effectiveness of threats in negotiations was examined by exploring two factors likely to affect it: implicitness, or the extent to which the threat mentions what action the perpetrator would take if the target does not comply; and timing, or the time when the threat is stated. Participants were given a negotiation scenario that differed only by the nature of the threat made by their counterpart. The design was a 2 (implicit vs. explicit threat) × 2 (early vs. late threat) factorial design with a control condition (no threat). The study showed that early-implicit and late-explicit threats were both more likely to elicit concessions than early-explicit and late-implicit threats. The two more effective threats were also the ones that made the perpetrator seem less aggressive. Further, perceived credibility mediated the positive effect that late-explicit threats had over late-implicit threats in eliciting concessions. These results support the claim that whether making the threat's sanction implicit is effective depends on its timing, as the nature of bargaining moves and perceptions varies over time (Pruitt 1981). They suggest that the way in which a threat is stated may dramatically influence its effect on the target.Are threats effective in negotiations? This broad question has received much theoretical and empirical attention from negotiation and conflict researchers, as it is relevant to the issue of value claiming in negotiation (e.g., Bonoma and Tedeschi 1974;Pruitt 1981;Schelling 1960;Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 1975). In general, past research suggests that threats increase the likelihood of concession making by the target (Rubin and Brown 1975), especially when they are seen as credible and not a mere bluff (for a classical review, see Tedeschi and Bonoma 1977). The purpose of this study is to investigate two factors relating to the way in which a threat is stated and the potential effect of these differences on the credibility and the effectiveness of the threat. Specifically, we examine how the implicitness and timing of a threat may affect the target's perception of the threat and, in turn, the degree to which he or she is willing to make concessions. Effectiveness of threats: A social psychological viewThe empirical social psychological literature has isolated a series of factors that influence the effectiveness of threats as a way to encourage the target to make concessions. These can be mostly organized around two kinds of factors: factors relating to the perpetrator and factors

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Section: How and When Threats Are Stated Matterssupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Among those perceptions, perceived aggressiveness of the perpetrator is critical in shaping targets' affective reactions and behavior in subsequent negotiations (Deutsch 1973;Pruitt 1981;Smith 1987;Tedeschi and Bonoma 1977, pp. 233-234).…”

Section: Perception Of the Perpetrator's Aggressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

Sinaceur

Neale

2005

Group Decis Negot

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“…In fact, a subject is assumed to act as a sort of agent for the person who supplied the points, instead of being an actual participant in the negotiation. When acting as an agent, a person's behavior may be different from what it would be when acting on his/her own behalf (Rubin and Sander 1991;Smith 1987). In addition, a subject could try logrolling, by comparing points and reducing the negotiation to a manipulation of figures, stating for example, "I will give you this, if you give me that, OK?," and doing this for many possible combinations of issues.…”

Section: Value Points Versus No-value Points In Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 96%

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

Korhonen¹,

Oretskin

Teich

et al. 1995

Group Decis Negot

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Abstract.This article examines whether a biased starting position impacts the outcome of negotiations using a Single Negotiating Text (SNT) (Raiffa 1982) type, two-party mediation. Two separate experiments were conducted, one in Helsinki and one in New Mexico, that systematically tested this issue and related questions. The article argues that, if a biased starting point is not compensated for by the path taken in subsequent steps, the bias will have considerable impact on the final outcome of the negotiations. In both experiments, the mediator played a very insignificant role, since the bias was incorporated into the text prior to the initiation of the exercise. In actuality, the experimenter played the role of the mediator, but only facilitated an exchange of information between the parties. The results of our experiments strongly support the hypothesis that such bias has a significant impact on the outcome o f the negotiations. The article co ncludes by presenting suggestions for developing starting SNTs.

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“…However, doubts were raised over the ability of the dichotomy to reflect the complexity of an individual's perceptions of conflict behavior. In other words, the limitation of single-dimension model is that it fails to encompass styles that involve high concern for both self and other, and styles that involve neither high concern for neither self nor other (Ruble & Thomas, 1976;Smith, 1987, Thomas & Kilmann, 1974Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Subsequent theorists then drawn on a new two-dimensional grid for classifying the styles as suggested by Mouton (1964, 1970) which is a self-oriented and other-oriented concern.…”

Section: Typologies Of Conflict Handling Stylesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Superior-subordinate Conflict Management Styles an Empirical Study of Malaysian Companies

Lee¹

2009

IBR

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This study examined the relationships between organizational context, conflict handling styles and subordinates' satisfaction with supervision. Data from 139 respondents from major industries in Malaysia including service, manufacturing, mining and construction demonstrated that subordinates were more satisfied with their superiors' supervision through their exercise of integrating, compromising, and obliging styles. On the other hand, subordinates who perceived their superiors as primarily utilizing dominating and avoiding style viewed them as incompetent in supervision and thus lowering their level of satisfaction with supervision. Among the conflict handling styles, integrating was most correlated with organic structure. The organic structure was found to be positively correlated with the satisfaction with supervision. These results implied that organic structure can be a potent force in maintaining organizational stability, although not unambiguously, the present results also seemed to suggest that subordinates tend to be less satisfied with superiors with wider span of control.

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Conflict and Negotiation: Trends and Emerging Issues

Cited by 59 publications

References 87 publications

Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

Not All Threats are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

Superior-subordinate Conflict Management Styles an Empirical Study of Malaysian Companies

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