Conflict and Compatibility: Some Thoughts on the Relationship between Science and Religion

Abstract

Scholarly studies of the science and religion question tend to take their cue from the subjective attitudes of individual writers. A potentially more useful approach focuses instead on the logical relationship between scientific and religious statements. Such a strategy generates two main types: a compatibilist model concerned only to show that religious and scientific claims are mutually consistent and an integrationist model that posits a strong correlation between theological and scientific language. Investigation of the two models' strengths and weaknesses suggests that a compatibilist approach is more consistent with the way in which Christian language is deployed on the ground.

An Absolute Distinction Between Faith and Science: Contrast Without Compartmentalization

“…In a similar vein, the theologian Ian A. McFarland states: “Barbour's categories of Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration have a commonsense plausibility that make them a pedagogically useful guide to the relevant literature” (, 192). The taxonomies which presuppose some distinction between science and religion are just a ladder to allow people into the field of science and religion.…”

“…According to him, the two main categories should be compatibility, where science and religion do not overlap, and integration, where science and religion are comparable, taking part in the same project (McFarland , 182). This different approach to the taxonomy has its value, but for our topic at hand it is only relevant to see that “type 1” of his first category “corresponds roughly to Barbour's category of Independence” (McFarland , 185). McFarland dismisses options that are similar to the Independence or Contrast approach in the same way as the authors discussed above.…”

“…McFarland dismisses options that are similar to the Independence or Contrast approach in the same way as the authors discussed above. He argues against claims that properly theological claims simply do not overlap with scientific ones, since they would “fail accurately to reflect Christian practice” (McFarland , 188). The criterion that McFarland uses here is the same as the authors above in that he refers to the messy, historical contexts in which distinctions between science and religion are made.…”

“…The criterion that McFarland uses here is the same as the authors above in that he refers to the messy, historical contexts in which distinctions between science and religion are made. He states, “The primary criterion will be empirical: How well does each of these ways of conceiving religious language correspond to the practices of believers on the ground?” (McFarland , 188). An absolute distinction or contrast between faith and science is discarded because it would be ahistorical and uncontextual if ordinary practice is taken into account.…”

“…In everyday practice, people are not so rigorous in their use of concepts as an absolute distinction between faith and science suggests. In a footnote McFarland adds: “This is not to deny that there may be improper use of nontheological criteria in assessing Christian doctrines, or that individual believers may mistake the character of a faith claim; it is only to point out that such judgments must be made on a case‐by‐case basis” (McFarland , 189n). If the relationship between faith and science is investigated on a case‐to‐case basis, one will find, according to McFarland, a “rather more complicated relationship between religious and scientific statements suggested by the practice of believers on the ground” (2003, 193).…”