Confidence Drives a Neural Confirmation Bias

Rollwage, Max; Hauser, Tobias; Loosen, Alisa M.; Moran, Rani; Dolan, Raymond J.; Fleming, Stephen M.

doi:10.32470/ccn.2019.1064-0

Cited by 21 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Following others (Talluri et al 2018;Rollwage et al 2020), we hold that this bias is a confirmation bias, because it fits standard definitions of this phenomenon: participants are suboptimal because they-or rather their perceptual systems-"look for" evidence supporting their perceptual decisions, and neglect evidence against those decisions. The effects we reviewed are also consistent with Nickerson's (1998) definition of confirmation bias: "the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand" (Nickerson 1998), which is used by Mercier and Sperber themselves (2011, p. 63).…”

Section: If This Is Not Confirmation Bias Outside Of the Reasoning Domain What Could Be?mentioning

confidence: 80%

“…Second, neurophysiological evidence suggests that the confirmation bias observed in confidence judgments operates by directly biasing the rate of accumulation of evidence in early sensory areas (Talluri et al 2018;Rollwage et al 2020). If this bias were entirely driven by reasoning, we should expect it to work instead through the implementation of abstract decision rules outside of the sensory cortices.…”

Section: Is Reasoning Involved In Confidence Confirmation Bias?mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason

Michel

Peters

2020

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive.

show abstract

Section: If This Is Not Confirmation Bias Outside Of the Reasoning Domain What Could Be?mentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Is Reasoning Involved In Confidence Confirmation Bias?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason

Michel

Peters

2020

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Confidence in initial choices can influence subsequent explore/exploit decisions 31 and can also modulate the processing of incoming evidence 8,16,17 . While we did not ask for any measure of subjective confidence at the time of Action 1, indirect evidence supports our interpretation on the relation between early confidence and CoM in our task.…”

Section: Low Confidence May Facilitate Changes Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, participants reported lower final confidence ratings on CoM trials compared to No-CoM trials (Figure 4a, Supplementary Note 1), and the P3 amplitudes evoked at the end of each trial significantly predicted confidence judgements ( Figure S2). Second, changes of mind often follow low confidence choices 16 . Thus, the fact that given equal amounts of evidence people changed their minds in some trials and not in others can itself be taken as a proxy of low confidence in their initial decisions.…”

Section: Low Confidence May Facilitate Changes Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, after a decision has been made, confidence in initial choices can further modulate how new information is processed [15][16][17] . High confidence choices are followed by modulations of the starting point and gain in computational models of post-decisional evidence accumulation that can account for the well-known confirmation bias 16 . Conversely, low confidence in initi l choices le ds to n incre sed prob bility of ch nging one"s mind 16 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A neural turning point - the EEG P3 component tracks unfolding changes of mind

Parés-Pujolràs

Hatchuel

Haggard

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The ability to change one’s mind is a key feature of human cognition. Yet, the neural mechanisms underpinning our capacity to change our minds remain poorly understood. Here, we investigated the neural correlates of evidence accumulation and changes of mind in a two-step sequential sampling task. Participants provided a first, quick guess regarding the relative frequencies of target letters in a visual stream, followed by a slower, more deliberate decision. We found that the P3 amplitude evoked by successive target letters tracks an internal signed decision variable and predicts choices on a single-trial level. Moreover, this neural decision variable offers new insights into the dynamics of changes of mind. In particular, we show that the start of evidence accumulation after the early decision constitutes a neural turning point: the P3 evoked by the first letter contrary to the initial decision can be used to predict subsequent changes of mind. Our results highlight a critical interaction between the processing of external evidence and endogenous modulations of decisional parameters that facilitate reversing an original decision.

show abstract

How celebrity status and gaze direction in ads drive visual attention to shape consumer decisions

D'Ambrogio

Werksman

Platt

et al. 2022

Psychology and Marketing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Marketers have long used celebrity endorsement to help viewers build strong brandproduct associations. Celebrity endorsements increase brand awareness and recall, but how celebrity endorsements shape the decision process remains unclear. A wealth of research indicates that people tend to follow someone else's gaze, yet its effects in advertisements have been largely unexplored. We recruited 77 participants to investigate the effect of celebrities and gaze-cueing in advertisements on both gaze behavior and binary choices. We combined computational modeling with eye-tracking and pupillometry to identify which internal components of processing are affected by celebrity endorsement. We found that gaze-cueing and celebrity endorsement influence gaze allocation and option selection. Further, results from computational modeling, eye-tracking, and pupillometry revealed that the effect of celebrity endorsement on decisions can be explained as an offset in the starting point of an evidence accumulation process as well as changes in the rate of accumulation, thereby biasing choice.

show abstract

Confidence Drives a Neural Confirmation Bias

Cited by 21 publications

References 0 publications

Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason

Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason

A neural turning point - the EEG P3 component tracks unfolding changes of mind

How celebrity status and gaze direction in ads drive visual attention to shape consumer decisions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About