Confabulating, Misremembering, Relearning: The Simulation Theory of Memory and Unsuccessful Remembering

Abstract

This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.

Thinking About Events: A Pragmatist Account of the Objects of Episodic Hypothetical Thought

“…One might worry that the fact that it does not require the presence of a trace connecting remembering to a past perceptual experience renders the account unable to distinguish cases of remembering from cases of veridical confabulation (see Michaelian 2016b;Bernecker 2017). A veridical confabulation is a mental state such that its pragmatic object recruits habits of action that allows for true inferences of the past but such that the subject has never been perceptually related to the relevant event.…”

Confabulating as Unreliable Imagining: In Defence of the Simulationist Account of Unsuccessful Remembering

“…Bernecker's (2017) attack on the simulationist account of confabulation (Michaelian 2016a) takes place against the background of a larger project (see Bernecker 2008Bernecker , 2010 devoted to developing and defending the causal theory of memory (Martin and Deutscher 1966). According to the causal theory, the difference between remembering a past event and merely imagining it is marked by the presence, in the case of remembering, of an appropriate causal connection between the subject's current representation of the event-his apparent memory-and his earlier experience of the event.…”

Unsuccessful Remembering: A Challenge for the Relational View of Memory

“…How to characterize memory errors and how to account for them are lively and controversial questions in the current literature, so I shall not take a stand on them, but the basic distinction between misremembering and confabulating utilized here seems to be relatively uncontroversial. For more discussions about misremembering and its relationship to current theories of remembering, see Robins (2016a) and Michaelian (2016b). For discussions about confabulation in particular, see Hirstein (2005), Robins (2018), and Michaelian (2018), and for discussions about the relationship of confabulation to current theories of remembering, see Michaelian (2016b;, Bernecker (2017), and Robins (2017;.…”

“…For more discussions about misremembering and its relationship to current theories of remembering, see Robins (2016a) and Michaelian (2016b). For discussions about confabulation in particular, see Hirstein (2005), Robins (2018), and Michaelian (2018), and for discussions about the relationship of confabulation to current theories of remembering, see Michaelian (2016b;, Bernecker (2017), and Robins (2017;. 13 As I will argue below, it fails to account for cases of veridical confabulations (Michaelian 2016b).…”

“…I have assumed throughout my discussion that confabulations are falsidical occurrences of remembering, that is, that they are cases where subjects get things wrong. However, some authors have recently pointed to the possibility of veridical confabulations (Robins 2016a(Robins , 2017Michaelian 2016b;Bernecker 2010), that is, cases where subjects get things right by mere accident. The most intuitive analogy here, as Michaelian (2016b) points out, is to veridi-cal perceptual hallucinations (see Lewis 1980).…”