Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from Iraq (2003-2006)

Pirnie, Bruce R.; O'Connell, Edward

doi:10.7249/rb9323

Cited by 6 publications

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“…To best empower the people with a stable government, initiatives should be crafted such as there is a realistic attribution of credit to the government, not the occupying COIN forces. 17 According to Galula, "The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority." 18 However, depending on the group's intentions and capabilities, if the belief of helplessness is targeted along with security and vulnerability, you may have the conditions to shift the hostile minority to the neutral majority or even the minority favorable to COIN forces.…”

Section: Helplessnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

McNeil¹

2009

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Section: Helplessnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…77Injustice and Entitlement. The insurgency in Iraq began among many nominalBaathists, including Sunni educators and administrators 78. As Galula points out, "For it is among the rejected elite that the insurgents can find the indispensable leaders.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

McNeil¹

2009

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“…Bruce Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 41-42.84 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 6.Figure 7shows the author's recreation of Major General Chiarelli and TF Baghdad's lines of operation (LOO). General Chiarelli established his LOOs to focus his forces on securing and stabilizing the Iraqi environment to facilitate a legitimate, freely elected city government that accepts economic pluralism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Comparing Models for the Restoration of Essential Services during Counterinsurgency Operations

Barbina¹

2011

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05-05-2011 REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph DATES COVERED (From -To AUTHOR(S)Major Anthony P. Barbina (U.S. Army) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Ave Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Command and General Staff College 731 McClellan Ave Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350 SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ABSTRACTWhat is the military's most effective model for restoring essential services during counterinsurgency operations? That research question drove this monograph to compare the most popular restoration model, the SWEAT Model (created by the Army Engineer School), against a new model, the Factor-Precedence Model (created by the author). Military and civilian experts have produced various models to provide tools that help practitioners understand, prioritize, and execute essential services restoration during counterinsurgency operations. This monograph assesses the effectiveness of the SWEAT and Factor-Precedence Models using two counterinsurgency case studies set in Baghdad, Iraq (2005 and. By the end of the monograph, the reader should understand why the Factor-Precedence Model proves more effective than the SWEAT Model for past and present essentials services restoration efforts. In addition, the reader should understand why the Factor-Precedence Model will provde useful during future counterinsurgency operations. What is the military's most effective model for restoring essential services during counterinsurgency operations? That question drove this monograph to compare the most popular restoration model, the SWEAT Model, against a new model, the Factor-Precedence Model. This monograph explains why the Factor-Precedence Model is more effective than the SWEAT Model for restoring essentials services during past, present, and future counterinsurgency operations. SUBJECT TERMSCounterinsurgency operations include those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a go...

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“…Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), 1-26. 13 David Rohde, "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones", New York Times, 5 October 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?_r=1&incamp=article_popular_4&pagewanted =all (accessed 2 October 2009).14 Bruce R Pirnie and. Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 97.…”

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confidence: 99%

Operational Intelligence in Irregular Warfare: Organized to the Task or to the Technology

Price¹

2009

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Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from Iraq (2003-2006)

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

Comparing Models for the Restoration of Essential Services during Counterinsurgency Operations

Operational Intelligence in Irregular Warfare: Organized to the Task or to the Technology

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