2008
DOI: 10.7249/rb9323
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Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from Iraq (2003-2006)

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Cited by 6 publications
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“…To best empower the people with a stable government, initiatives should be crafted such as there is a realistic attribution of credit to the government, not the occupying COIN forces. 17 According to Galula, "The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority." 18 However, depending on the group's intentions and capabilities, if the belief of helplessness is targeted along with security and vulnerability, you may have the conditions to shift the hostile minority to the neutral majority or even the minority favorable to COIN forces.…”
Section: Helplessnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…To best empower the people with a stable government, initiatives should be crafted such as there is a realistic attribution of credit to the government, not the occupying COIN forces. 17 According to Galula, "The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority." 18 However, depending on the group's intentions and capabilities, if the belief of helplessness is targeted along with security and vulnerability, you may have the conditions to shift the hostile minority to the neutral majority or even the minority favorable to COIN forces.…”
Section: Helplessnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…77Injustice and Entitlement. The insurgency in Iraq began among many nominalBaathists, including Sunni educators and administrators 78. As Galula points out, "For it is among the rejected elite that the insurgents can find the indispensable leaders.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bruce Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 41-42.84 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 6.Figure 7shows the author's recreation of Major General Chiarelli and TF Baghdad's lines of operation (LOO). General Chiarelli established his LOOs to focus his forces on securing and stabilizing the Iraqi environment to facilitate a legitimate, freely elected city government that accepts economic pluralism.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), 1-26. 13 David Rohde, "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones", New York Times, 5 October 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?_r=1&incamp=article_popular_4&pagewanted =all (accessed 2 October 2009).14 Bruce R Pirnie and. Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 97.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%