Conditions and Analyses of Knowing

Abstract

This article examines the essential conditions of propositional knowledge. It focuses on the conditions that must be satisfied for a person to have knowledge, specifically knowledge that something is so. Traditionally, knowledge has been analyzed in terms of justified true belief. This article first addresses philosophers' disagreements concerning the truth and belief conditions. After introducing the justification condition, it presents counterexamples (specifically Gettier-type counterexamples) challenging the standard analysis of knowledge. These challenges have provoked several attempts to replace or to supplement the justification condition for knowledge. This article presents and assesses several of these, including early causal theories, the nonaccidentality requirement, reliable process and conditional analyses, the reliable-indicator analysis, the conclusive reasons analysis, defeasibility analyses, analyses in terms of cognitive or intellectual virtues, and Plantinga's proper functionalism.

Knowing That P without Believing That P

“…Others who deny that propositional knowledge entails belief include Woozley ; Williams ; Black ; Margolis ; Annis ; Ring ; Harker ; Lewis ; Shope ; Schwitzgebel . Williamson argues that belief is not conceptually prior to knowledge but nonetheless asserts that knowledge entails belief.…”

Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account

“…We might say that in such scenarios M has been restoratively rigged. Some theorists, including Robert Shope (2002;also Joe Salerno 2004), have adduced cases of restorative rigging against (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Steven Luper (1984, 1987, Ernest Sosa (2002Sosa ( , 2003, and Timothy Williamson (2000). Restoratively rigged cases have at least some of the earmarks of Gettier's original examples.…”