Conditioning and Interpretation Shifts

Romeijn, Jan-Willem

doi:10.1007/s11225-012-9415-x

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…Therefore, the consequent of principle (3) should really use the conditional probability P i ([!ϕ]ψ | ϕ), rather than just P i (ψ | ϕ). 4 4 Romeijn [45] provides an analysis that stays closer in spirit to probability theory proper. He argues that the public announcement of ϕ induces a shift in the interpretation of ψ (in our terminology:…”

Section: Higher-order Information In Public Announcementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Demey

Kooi²

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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This paper surveys recent work on probabilistic extensions of epistemic and dynamic-epistemic logics (the latter include the basic system of public announcement logic as well as the full product update logic). It emphasizes the importance of higher-order information as a distinguishing feature of these logics. This becomes particularly clear in the dynamic setting: although there exists a clear relationship between usual Bayesian conditionalization and public announcement, the probabilistic effects of the latter are in general more difficult to describe, because of the subtleties involved in higher-order information. Finally, the paper discusses some applications of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, such as the Lockean thesis in formal epistemology and Aumann's agreement theorem in game theory.

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Section: Higher-order Information In Public Announcementsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Demey

Kooi²

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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“…13 The idea that probability updates and changes in the interpretation are intertwined is inspired by Romeijn (2012) where it is used to develop a Bayesian approach for a problem case in dynamic epistemic logic.…”

Section: Introducing Contextsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The motto is to extend the theory of probability to conditionals while taking the Thesis as a guide, not to reformulate it to save the Thesis.13 The idea that probability updates and changes in the interpretation are intertwined is inspired byRomeijn (2012) where it is used to develop a Bayesian approach for a problem case in dynamic epistemic logic.…”

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confidence: 99%

Placing Probabilities of Conditionals in Context

Hermens

2014

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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In this paper I defend the tenability of the Thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This is done by adopting the view that the interpretation of a conditional may differ from context to context. Several triviality results are (re-)evaluated in this view as providing natural constraints on probabilities for conditionals and admissible changes in the interpretation. The context-sensitive approach is also used to re-interpret some of the intuitive rules for conditionals and probabilities such as Bayes’ rule,Import-Export, and Modus Ponens. I will show that, contrary to consensus, the Thesis is in fact compatible with these re-interpreted rules.

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A comparison of imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster–Shafer theory for automated decisions under ambiguity

Radzvilas,

Peden,

Tortoli

et al. 2024

Journal of Logic and Computation

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Ambiguity occurs insofar as a reasoner lacks information about the relevant physical probabilities. There are objections to the application of standard Bayesian inductive logic and decision theory in contexts of significant ambiguity. A variety of alternative frameworks for reasoning under ambiguity have been proposed. Two of the most prominent are Imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster–Shafer theory. We compare these inductive logics with respect to the Ambiguity Dilemma, which is a problem that has been raised for Imprecise Bayesianism. We develop an agent-based model comparison that isolates the difference between the two inductive logics in their updating methods. We find that Dempster–Shafer theory does not avoid the Ambiguity Dilemma. We discuss the implications of this result.

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Conditioning and Interpretation Shifts

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Placing Probabilities of Conditionals in Context

A comparison of imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster–Shafer theory for automated decisions under ambiguity

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