Conditionality Measures within the Euro Area Crisis: A Challenge to the Democratic Principle?

Abstract

The crisis of the Eurozone and the risk of default for countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal has led to the intervention of international and supranational institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission, which provided bailouts under a strict programme of conditionality measures to be implemented by the borrowing countries. The first part of the article explores the nature of conditionality measures and their impact on democratic governance within the European Union legal framework. The second part of the article considers the challenges posed by conditionality specifically to the European Union legal framework-including human rights protection and the democratic principle-both at the European Union and at national levels. The third part deals with the role of the national supreme courts in judging the legitimacy of such interventions, acting as watchdogs with respect to the democratic principle but, at the same time, creating a 'short circuit' of legitimation regarding decisions made by national governments (even if conditional).

Navigating coercion in political rhetoric: shifting strategies to cope with intervention by the Troika in Portugal

“…Although Portugal was not the only country audited by the Troika, we have chosen the case due to its special characteristics. The Portuguese government had to cope not only with the increasing resistance of the population, but also with the Constitutional Court as a veto player during these three years invalidating some of the policy proposals (Baraggia, 2015;Magone, 2014;Moury and Standring, 2017). Yet Portugal was considered 'the Troika's good pupil', who implemented the required policies with the minimum of fuss and delay (Magone, 2014, p. 353).…”

Control by aggregation? Critical reflections on global constitutionalism in the shadow of looming transnational emergency powers

“…The measures fashioned by the EU, the exemplary multilevel constitutional order in global constitutionalism, to respond to the Eurozone crisis have been criticized for reasons relating to the rule of law principle. First, they are blamed for subverting human rights and undermining the European social model (Baraggia, , p. 277; White, , p. 306). Apart from the mandatory individual “bail‐ins” introduced as part of the Cypriot rescue package, the lowering of living standards resulting from national austerity measures was ascribed to the conditionality requirements tied to the bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus as well as Spain (see Baraggia, , pp.…”

“…4–23). Not only did the legislative role of national parliaments in vetting the bailout conditionality instruments become nominal, but democratic will, as manifested in the referendum before the Greek government's reluctant acceptance of the second bailout in July 2015, was also pushed aside under pressure from creditors (Baraggia, , pp. 281–283; Kuo, , p. 85; Scicluna, , pp.…”

Sustainable Enjoyment of Economic and Social Rights in Times of Crisis

“…The dismal human face of the crisis that came about as a result of the crisis itself and the strict austerity measures, has been marked by poverty and social exclusion, particularly of vulnerable groups, thereby, limiting or even nullifying the enjoyment of rights provided for in the Charter. 16 Examples, for purposes of demonstrating the deterioration of the standard of living of persons living in the EU, and particularly those belonging to vulnerable groups, are many but two will be put forth for purposes of a brief illustration,. The European Federation of National Organisations working with the homeless identified a systematic pattern of more homeless migrants due to welfare and housing cuts, 17 while the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that cuts in public expenditure are impacting disabled persons "in a particularly harsh way".…”