2023
DOI: 10.1111/abac.12283
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Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Abstract: Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…They are also in line with the findings of Zhu et al. (2022) and Wang & Zhu (2023), which suggest that voluntary disclosures hold greater value for investors.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…They are also in line with the findings of Zhu et al. (2022) and Wang & Zhu (2023), which suggest that voluntary disclosures hold greater value for investors.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Our findings support the shareholder expense view of mandatory CSR reporting (Chen et al, 2018;Grewal et al, 2019). 2 They are also in line with the findings of Zhu et al (2022) and Wang & Zhu (2023), which suggest that voluntary disclosures hold greater value for investors.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 88%
“…We obtained data on management earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S and excluded countries with no management forecast data during our sample period. Considering that these forecasts are mandatory in Japan and conditional mandatory in China (Wang and Zhu, 2022), owing to which, the decisions of managers in these countries regarding the quantity and quality of earnings forecast disclosures may differ from those of other countries, we also exclude firms from Japan and China from this analysis. In addition, for the regression of MF_PREC , the analysis sample is restricted to firm years that issue management forecasts.…”
Section: Additional Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They usually interact directly with firm management and raise questions with top managers about various aspects of corporate strategy and performance through various channels, such as earnings release conferences and corporate site visits (Yu, 2008). From an agency perspective, analysts' gathering of private information can help detect managers' misbehavior; therefore, analysts are effective external monitors of firm management who can discipline firms for engaging in opportunistic managerial behavior by reducing information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Tsang, Wang, Wu, & Lee, 2022; Wang & Zhu, 2022; Wang, Luo, & Liu, 2022). Firms followed by more analysts are subject to more intense external monitoring; therefore, they should have better financial reporting quality.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%