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Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
Wild bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata) were studied in southern India to assess their ability to discriminate non-venomous, venomous and predatory snakes. Realistic snake models were presented to eight troops of bonnet macaques at feeding stations and their behavior was video-recorded 3 min before and 3 min after snake exposure. Snakes presented were: (1) venomous Indian cobra (Naja naja) displaying an open hood with ÔeyespotsÕ; (2) venomous common Indian krait (Bungarus caeruleus); (3) non-venomous green keelback (Macropisthodan plumbicolor); (4) non-venomous rat snake (Ptyas mucosus); and (5) Indian python (Python molurus) which preys on macaques. Latencies to detect and react to the snakes were evaluated to determine initial responsiveness. Longer-term assessment was measured as the percentage of time individuals looked at the snakes and monitored the activity of nearby individuals before and after snake detection. All snake models engendered caution and maintenance of a safe distance. Alarm calling occurred only during python presentations. The cobra engendered a startle response or running in the largest percentage of individuals after its detection, whereas the rat snake and python elicited bipedal standing or ambulating to monitor the snakes. We also examined the influence of age on snake recognition. Juveniles and subadults looked at the cobra, krait, and python for a larger percentage of time than adults did; albeit, adults looked at the python substantially longer than at the other snakes. Age differences in behavior suggest that, with the exception of the python, repeated experience with snakes in the wild moderates excitability, consistent with the likely threat of envenomation.
In this article I propose a model that posits three major sources of influence on behavior-basic human nature (via universal psychological processes), culture (via social roles), and personality (via individual role identities) and argue that individual behaviors are the products of the interaction between the three. I discuss how culture emerges from the interaction of basic human nature and the ecological contexts in which groups exist, and how social roles are determined by culture-specific psychological meanings attributed to situational contexts. The model further suggests that situational context moderates the relative contributions of the three sources in influencing behavior. I provide examples of apparent contradictory findings in the study of emotion that can be explained by the model proposed.
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