Conditional Cooperation and the Effect of Punishment

Punishment: one tool, many uses

“… 2015 , 2016 ). Similar results have been obtained in the context of n -player games (de Melo and Piaggi 2015 ; Kirchkamp and Mill 2018 ; Rand et al . 2009 ; Sefton et al .…”

“… 2014 ; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007 ; Yamagishi 1986 ). In a recent experimental study, the number of free-riders increased under the threat of punishment, relative to a condition where no punishment was possible (Kirchkamp and Mill 2018 ). By way of explanation for this counter-intuitive result, the authors posit either a possible crowding out effect (where any intrinsic motivation to cooperate might be extinguished by the extrinsic threat of punishment) or the possibility that people expected to be punished and thus attempted to minimise payoff losses ex ante by defecting.…”

“…Relatedly, it is unclear to what extent punishment increases cooperation by converting defectors into co-operators (i.e. increasing the number of co-operators), or by increasing the contributions of conditional co-operators (see Kirchkamp and Mill 2018 ; Lergetporer et al . 2014 ; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007 ; Yamagishi 1986 ).…”